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ABSTRACT
Many attacks that threaten service providers and legitimate users are anoma-
lous behaviors out of specification, and this dissertation mainly focuses on
detecting “large” Internet flows consuming more resources than those al-
located to them. Being able to identify large flows accurately can greatly
benefit Quality of Service (QoS) schemes and Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DDoS) defenses. Although large-flow detection has been previously
explored, proposed approaches have not been practical for high-capacity core
routers due to high memory and processing overhead. Additionally, more ef-
ficient schemes are vulnerable against specially tailored attacks in which at-
tackers time their packets based on the knowledge of legitimate cross-traffic.
In this dissertation, we aim to design computation- and memory-efficient
large-flow detection algorithms to effectively mitigate the large-flow damage
in adversarial environments. We propose three large-flow detection schemes:
Exact-Outside-Ambiguity-Region Detector (EARDet), Recursive Large-Flow
Detection (RLFD), and the scheme of in-Core Limiting of Egregious Flows
(CLEF), which is a hybrid scheme with one EARDet and two RLFDs.
EARDet is a deterministic algorithm that guarantees exact large-flow de-
tection outside an ambiguity region: there is no false accusation for legitimate
flows complying with a low-bandwidth threshold, and no false negative for
large flows above a high-bandwidth threshold, with no assumption on the
input traffic or attack patterns. Because of the strong enforcement with the
arbitrary window model, EARDet is able to immediately detect both flat
and bursty flows. RLFD is designed to complement EARDet in detecting
large flows in EARDet’s ambiguity region. RLFD is a probabilistic de-
tection scheme that gives higher probability for detecting large flows with
higher volume, thus guarantee limited damage (to legitimate flows) across
a wide range of flow overuse amounts. Finally CLEF combines EARDet
and RLFD to achieve both rapid detection for very large flows and even-
ii
tually detection for small, persistent large flows. Theoretical analysis and
experimental evaluation both suggest the CLEF’s efficiency and effectiveness
outperform existing algorithms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many attacks that threaten the service providers and the legitimate users
in the Internet are anomalous behaviors that are different from the legitimate
behaviors in the Internet. At the network level, the attack traffic has patterns
and features that differ from legitimate traffic. For example, the Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks flood the targeted machine or resource to cause service
with a huge amount of traffic to overload systems and prevent legitimate
traffic from being processed.
In this dissertation, we focus on detecting misbehaving “large” network
flows1 that use more than their allocated resources. Large-flow detection is
not only an important mechanism for Quality of Service (QoS) [3] schemes
such as IntServ [4], but also for DDoS defense mechanisms that allocate
bandwidth to network flows [5–7]. With the recent emergence of volumetric
DDoS attacks, the topics of DDoS defense mechanisms and QoS are gaining
importance; thus, the need for efficient in-network accounting is increasing.
Unfortunately, per-flow resource accounting is too expensive to perform
in the core of the network [2]. Large-scale Internet core routers have an
aggregate capacity of several Terabits per second (Tbps), which demands
highly efficient schemes to detect flows that violate their flow specifications.
The general approach to catch misbehaving flows without per-flow counters
is to assign flows to a traffic class with a maximum sending rate and to
embed the traffic class in the packet header. A router on the path can then
detect misbehaving flows by finding the largest ones within a traffic class. In
This dissertation reuses some parts including text and figures from Wu, H. et al.
“Efficient Large Flow Detection over Arbitrary Windows: An Algorithm Exact Outside An
Ambiguity Region”, IMC ’14 Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement
Conference, pp. 209-222 [1], c©2014 Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. Reprinted
by permission. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2663716.2663724.
1As in prior literature [1,2], the term “large flow” denotes a flow that sends more than
its allocated bandwidth.
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Chapters 3 and 4, we analyze and design algorithms for large-flow detection
that can scale to high-capacity core routers.
In Chapter 3, we first consider a new model of exactness outside an am-
biguity region, which is defined to be a range of bandwidths below a high-
bandwidth threshold and above a low-bandwidth threshold. Existing large-
flow detectors that only check the average throughput over a certain time
period cannot detect bursty flows and are therefore easily fooled by attackers.
To achieve exactness outside the ambiguity region, we propose a determin-
istic large-flow detection algorithm, EARDet, that detects all large flows
(including bursty flows) and avoids false accusation against any small flows,
regardless of the input traffic. The core idea of EARDet is to monitor
flows over arbitrary time windows built on a frequent items finding algo-
rithm based on average frequency. Despite its strong properties, EARDet
takes very low storage overhead regardless of input traffic and is surprisingly
scalable because it focuses on accurate classification of large flows and small
flows only.
In Chapter 4 we propose a novel randomized Recursive Large-Flow Detec-
tion (RLFD) algorithm to complement EARDet to detect large flows missed
by EARDet in the ambiguity region. Unlike existing detectors, RLFD effi-
ciently distinguishes large flows from legitimate flows by evaluating one set
of flows at a time, and recursively shrinking the set of suspected large flows.
Larger flows are detected with higher probability in RLFD, so the expected
detection time decreases in the level of overuse, resulting in limited damage
(to legitimate flows) across a wide range of flow overuse amounts. Because
the immediate detection of large flows is not possible due to memory con-
straints, the goal should be to minimize the damage caused to legitimate
flows; in such an environment, it is likely more important to rapidly catch
very high-rate flows than it is to quickly catch mildly misbehaving flows. Our
damage model considers two causes of packet loss: loss caused by large flows,
and false positives that punish legitimate flows.
We further propose a hybrid scheme CLEF, short for in-Core Limiting
of Egregious Flows combining the deterministic EARDet mechanism for
rapid detection of very large flows with the RLFD algorithm for eventual
detection of large flows. We analyze a range of attacks against select detection
schemes and find CLEF provides strong resilience against attacks even in its
worst-case background traffic, and enables efficient implementation on high-
2
capacity core routers.
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CHAPTER 2
LARGE-FLOW DETECTION
BACKGROUND
2.1 Large-Flow Detection Problem
2.1.1 Flow Model
A flow is a collection of related traffic; for example, Internet flows are com-
monly characterized by a 5-tuple (source / destination IP / port, transport
protocol). A large flow is one that exceeds a flow specification during a pe-
riod of length t. A flow specification can be defined using a leaky bucket
descriptor TH(t) = γt + β, where γ > 0 and β > 0 are the maximum legiti-
mate rate and burstiness allowance, respectively. Flow specifications can be
enforced in several ways: landmark-window, in which the flow specification
is enforced over a limited set of starting times; sliding-window, in which the
flow specification is enforced over a sliding time window with fixed length;
or arbitrary-window, in which the flow specification is enforced over every
possible starting time.
Flow identifiers. In general, the information associated with a collection
of related traffic acts as the flow identifiers to group traffic into different flows.
For Internet flows, the information are commonly in the packet header, e.g.,
5-tuple (source / destination IP / port, transport protocol).
In Chapters 3 and 4, we aim to design a generic large-flow detection solu-
tion for Internet flows, which can be applied in cases without assumption on
flow identifiers.
As in prior work in flow monitoring, we assume each flow has a unique
and unforgeable ID, e.g., using source authentication techniques such as ac-
countable IPs [8], ICING [9], IPA [10], OPT [11], Passport [12], or with
RPKI [13]. Such techniques can be deployed in the current Internet or in a
future Internet architecture, e.g., Nebula [14], SCION [15], or XIA [16].
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Internet flow: Packet streams. Internet flows are traffic of packet
streams. In the packet space X , we consider that the large-flow detector
processes a packet stream X = 〈x1, · · · , xk〉 coming in sequence through a
link with capacity ρ, where xi ∈ X ∀i = 1 · · · k. Due to the high capacity of
the link and the limit of the memory of the detector, the detector can only
process the packets once (i.e. only making one pass over the packet stream).
For a packet x, we make the following denotation for later discussion. The
time at which the large-flow detector observes the packet x is denoted as
time(x); the flow ID of the packet x is denoted as fid(x); and the size of
packet x is denoted as size(x). Then we denote the traffic volume of a flow
f during time [t1, t2) as vol(f, t1, t2) ,
∑
x∈X ,fid(x)=f,t1≤time(x)<t2 size(x).
2.1.2 Large Flows and Legitimate Flows
The large flow here is the flow which occupies high bandwidth or consumes a
large volume of link bandwidth over some short time window. Therefore, we
defined a threshold function TH(t2 − t1) for the limit of bandwidth. The t2
and t1 in the function indicate that the function only depends on the length
of the time window [t2, t1).
For a flow f , if there exists a time window [t1, t2) over which the volume of
flow vol(f, t1, t2) exceeds a threshold function TH(t2 − t1), then the flow f is
classified as large flow; otherwise, the flow f is considered as legitimate flow.
Namely, (i) when vol(f, t1, t2) > TH(t2− t1), f is a large flow; conversely, (ii)
when vol(f, t1, t2) ≤ TH(t2 − t1), f is considered as a legitimate flow.
Leaky bucket model. Ideally, people want to define large flow based
on the leaky bucket model. The leaky bucket model is widely used in the
packet switched computer network for checking the traffic of data packets and
defining the bandwidth limits and burstiness. In the leaky bucket model, the
bucket is actually a counter with as fixed rate to decrease its value when the
counter is larger than zero. When new packets of a flow arrive at the bucket,
it increases the value by the volume of the packets and checks whether the
value exceeds the threshold of the leaky bucket. If the threshold is exceeded,
then the flow exceeds the bandwidth limit, i.e. the decreasing rate of the
bucket.
Then, the threshold function based on the form of the leaky bucket de-
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scriptor is: TH(t) = γ t + β, where γ > 0, β > 0. The γ and β here are the
decrease rate and threshold of the leaky bucket. However, utilizing the leaky
bucket algorithm to check large flow is impractical. This is because network
links contain numerous flows and usually run at high speed (e.g. the rate of
backbone line is above gigabytes/s), it is very hard to keep the per-flow state
as the leaky bucket model does. Thus, catching the large flow defined by the
leaky bucket model is challenging.
2.1.3 Time Window Models
The time window [t1, t2) is a range of time over which the large-flow detector
considers the volume of the flow. For example, in some approaches, if the
volume of the large flow in [t1, t2) exceeds some threshold, then, it is judged as
large flow. To identify the large flows defined by the leaky bucket model, the
algorithm has to use the arbitrary window model [17]. However achieving the
arbitrary window model in practice is challenging, therefore, people usually
use some approximate approaches to roughly identify large flows. Thus we
have two more typical time window models: the landmark window model [2,
18–24] and the sliding window model [25–27].
Landmark window model. The landmark window model takes the
closest landmark in the past as the starting time and the current time as
the ending time for each time window (e.g. the landmark could be placed in
each 10 seconds). In other words, the landmark window model checks every
time window in {[ti, ti + ∆i)|∆i < ti+1 − ti}.
Sliding window model. The sliding window model considers the recent
traffic as more important than the old traffic, thus the time window starts at
some recent time in the past and ends at the current time. Once a new packet
arrives, the sliding window model will exclude the oldest packet and keep the
newest one. We can state the sliding time window as {[t−∆, t)|t ∈ R}.
Arbitrary window model. The arbitrary window model is the stronger
time window model to detect the large flows. It monitors each possible time-
scales that starts at every instant in time and ends at the current time.
Namely, for a flow f , the arbitrary window model monitors it over windows
{[t1, t2)|∀ t1, t2 ∈ R, t1 < t2}. Therefore, it is more difficult for large flows to
evade the detection in front of the arbitrary window model, as demonstrated
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40 Gbps link congested by
50-Byte packets
Landmark windowmodel
(landmark at 0)
Examine flows in [0, t) ==> flow B evades detection
Sliding windowmodel
(window size = 30ns)
Examine flows in [t-30, t) ==> flow B evades detection
Arbitrary windowmodel Examine flows in [s, t) for all t > s >= 0 ==> flow B is a
large flow over [10, 50) and can be detected
0 10 20 30 40 t=50 (ns)
A B C D B
Figure 2.1: In this example, if a flow’s volume in time window w with any
size is larger than 40 Mbps·w + 500 Kb, then it is a large flow. The flow B
exceeds the threshold over time window w = [10, 50), however, only the
arbitrary time window can catch it [1].
in Figure 2.1.1
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we review prior works by the techniques they use in the al-
gorithm as presented in the survey by Cormode and Hadjieleftheriou [28]:
counter-based technique, sketch-based technique, and sampling-based tech-
nique. We pick and summarize some typical algorithms in each category and
discuss their drawbacks.
2.2.1 Counter-Based Algorithm
There are many counter-based algorithms working to find the frequent item,
which is closely related to our large-flow identification problem. In a stream
with m items, the frequent item is the item that presents more than m
n+1
times, where the n is the number of counters. The Misra-Gries (MG) algo-
rithm [18] takes a stream of items as input and find the set of frequent items
exactly. The MG algorithm extends the majority algorithm [29, 30], which
only considers finding the majority vote.
1Figure 2.1 is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1] c©2014 Association for
Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
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2.2.2 Sketch-Based Algorithm
The sketch-based algorithm takes a stream as input, applies linear projection
or hashing on the input, and produces a matrix. The matrix usually consists
of a small number of bits.
Fixed-window-based Multistage Filters (FMF). A multistage filter
algorithm is proposed by Estan and Varghese [2] to detect large flows over the
fixed window model2 (called FMF in this chapter). The FMF has multiple
stages, and each of the stages contains an array with the same number of
counters. When a packet arrives at the multistage filter, its flow identifier is
hashed to one counter in each stage (each stage has a different hash function).
For each counter, the value increases by the size of the packet assigned to
it. Once all of the corresponding counters of a flow f violate the pre-defined
threshold, the flow f is judged as large flow.
Arbitrary-window-based Multistage Filters (AMF). One of the ob-
vious drawbacks of FMF is that the fixed window model cannot catch the
bursty flow3 spanning two measurement intervals. To address this, Estan [17]
proposed an improved algorithm of multistage filters based on the arbitrary
window model. The counters in each stage are replaced by leaky buckets
according to the large flow threshold (i.e. TH(t) = γt+β). The same applies
to FMF, a flow is judged as a large flow if its corresponding leaky buckets
are all violated.
2.2.3 Sampling-Based Algorithm
By sampling the packets in the link, the overhead of the algorithm can be
reduced effectively. The Sampled NetFlow [31] is a classic sampling-based al-
gorithm which samples packets with a rate of 1/γ and estimates the frequency
of flows by multiplying the count by γ. To improve the Sampled NetFlow,
Estan and Varghese [2] propose the sample and hold method which exam-
ines every incoming packets: if the flow of the packet is monitored, then
increase the corresponding count; otherwise add the flow of the packet into
the monitoring list with certain probability.
2The fixed window model is a special case of the landmark window model with a fixed
measurement interval.
3Bursty flow is a kind of large flow which sends very high volume traffic in a short time.
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2.2.4 Top-k Detection
Top-k heavy hitter algorithms can be used to identify flows that use more
than 1/k of bandwidth. The space saving algorithm [32] finds the top-k fre-
quent items by evicting the item with the lowest counter value. HashPipe [33]
improves upon space saving so that it can be practically implemented on
switching hardware. However, HashPipe still requires keeping 80 KB to de-
tect large flows that use more than 0.3% of link capacity, whereas CLEF can
enforce flow specifications as low as 10−6 of the link capacity using only 10
KB of memory. Tong et al. [34] propose an efficient heavy hitter detector im-
plemented on FPGA but the enforceable flow specifications are several orders
looser than CLEF. Moreover, misbehaving flows close to the flow specifica-
tion can easily bypass such heavy hitter detectors. The FPs caused by heavy
hitters prevent network operators from applying strong punishment to the
detected flows.
2.2.5 Other Related Algorithms
Cardinality estimation. Chen et al. [35] and Xiao et al. [36] pro-
pose memory-efficient algorithms for estimating per-flow cardinality (e.g.,
the number of packets). These algorithms, however, cannot guarantee large-
flow detection in adversarial environments due to under- or over-estimation
of the flow size.
UniMon framework. Liu et al. [37] propose a generic network monitor-
ing framework called UniMon that allows extraction of various flow statistics.
It creates flow statistics for all flows, but has high FP and FN when used to
detect large flows.
2.2.6 Drawbacks of Current Algorithms
We mainly discuss the MG algorithm, FMF, AMF, and sample and hold
method. The main drawback among the first three algorithms is that they
cannot avoid false accusation on the legitimate flows (non-frequent items).
For the MG algorithm, it can make sure all the frequent items are stored in
the counter at last, but cannot exclude non-frequent items in the one-pass
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process. The FMF and AMF are the multistage filters algorithms, whose
counter could be shared by both large flows and legitimate flows. With
some probability, the hash function could map a large flow and legitimate
flow to exactly the same counter in each stage. This problem is the nature
of multistage filters and cannot be avoided. In Chapter 4, we even show
that the multistage filters suffer very high false positives when the memory
resource is limited.
Since the sample and hold algorithm just samples the flows to measure, it
may not check some large flows. Therefore the sample and hold algorithm
has a false detection rate on the large flows. That is, a large flow could evade
detection with some probability.
Because the MG algorithm, sample and hold algorithm, and FMF are
based on the landmark window model, they cannot catch bursty flows as
Section 2.1.3 illustrated.
Although AMF can guarantee a rate of catching all the large flows by its
arbitrary window model, it introduces more false detections on the legitimate
flows than FMF. Because the leaky bucket is more sensitive to being violated,
there are more flows that could exceed the threshold of the leaky bucket
model than the fixed window model.
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CHAPTER 3
EXACT LARGE-FLOW DETECTION
OUTSIDE AN AMBIGUITY REGION
3.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we consider a novel model of exactness outside a small am-
biguity region, which contains flows that use bandwidth between two con-
figurable thresholds. Our model classifies flows as either large, medium, or
small. A large flow is defined to be a flow whose volume ever exceeds a high-
bandwidth threshold function over any arbitrary window. A small flow is
defined to be a flow whose volume is consistently lower than a low-bandwidth
threshold function over all arbitrary window. The rest are defined as medium
flows, namely the flows in the ambiguity region. Exactness outside ambigu-
ity region guarantees no missed detection on large flows (including bursty
flows) and no false accusation against any small flows. This model is rea-
sonable, because it limits the damage caused by large flows and allows exist-
ing techniques to handle the medium flows statistically. Furthermore, prior
works [2,17] also involves a region similar to our ambiguity region, but they
only provide probabilistic bounds and therefore are not exact outside that re-
gion. The ambiguity region between the high-bandwidth and low-bandwidth
thresholds allows us to trade the level of exactness for scalability, so that
we can maintain a state small enough to fit into limited on-chip memory for
link-speed update.
The new models of exactness and arbitrary window benefit many applica-
tions. For example:
• Bandwidth guarantees : To enforce bandwidth allocation, schemes such
as IntServ make impractical assumptions that either every router keeps
per-flow state [3] or first-hop routers are trusted to regulate traffic on
a per-flow basis [38] on behalf of intermediate routers [39]. Although
a scalable and robust approach was proposed [40], it causes collateral
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damage due to the detection delay caused by recursion; moreover it
cannot catch bursty flows. Our efficient identifier with these two new
models can help enforce bandwidth limits on flows because of its fast
detection with no false accusation on the legitimate small flows, and
no false circumvention on large flows including bursty flows.
• Detecting various DoS flows : Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks can use
either large attack flows or bursty attack flows; however, most existing
algorithms check average throughput, which cannot catch large bursty
flows. On the contrary, using the arbitrary window model, the detector
can effectively detect DoS by bursty flows.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing algorithms provide
exactness outside an ambiguity region under the arbitrary window model.
Because prior algorithms detect average throughput rather than violations
of the arbitrary window model, they cannot detect bursty attacks (e.g. Shrew
attack [41]). For example, in a large-flow detection system that resets state
and starts a new measurement interval periodically [2], a large bursty flow can
bypass detection by staying lower than the threshold of throughput across
this whole interval, or even by deliberately spreading its burst across two
consecutive intervals. Although randomization of measurement intervals can
mitigate the problem above, randomized algorithms are inherently proba-
bilistic and thus may be unable to provide strong deterministic guarantees.
Without exactness outside an ambiguity region, most existing algorithms
cannot provide guarantees to protect the legitimate flows. Existing random-
ized algorithms are not exact, because their detection is probabilistic. As a
result, they are often configured to provide a lower detection rate for misbe-
having flows in order to reduce the false alarm rate for well-behaved flows.
Besides lacking exactness and the arbitrary window model, the storage
overhead of existing algorithms may grow unboundedly with the size of the
input traffic in the presence of malicious inputs. For example, adversaries can
perturb their flows’ traffic patterns by varying the size and timing of packets
sent by those flows so as to cause algorithmic complexity attacks [42], as many
algorithms bound their storage and computational overhead by assuming the
flow sizes follow a certain distribution such as Zipfian.
To identify large flows over arbitrary windows with low storage overhead,
we explore deterministic algorithms with a new model of exactness con-
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sidering a small ambiguity region. We propose EARDet (Exact-Outside-
Ambiguity-Region Detector), a simple, efficient, and no-per-flow-state large-
flow detector which is exact outside ambiguity region regardless of the input
traffic. Built on the Misra-Gries algorithm (a frequent items finding algo-
rithm based on average frequency) [18], EARDet is a streaming algorithm
with simple operations: it only keeps a small array of counters which are
increased or decreased as each new packet arrives. A flow is identified as a
large flow if its associated counter exceeds a threshold.
Surprisingly, despite EARDet’s strong guarantees, we show in our analy-
sis that EARDet requires extremely small amounts of memory that fit into
on-chip SRAM for line-speed packet processing. We discuss implementation
details to further demonstrate EARDet’s efficiency. EARDet is highly
scalable because it focuses on accurate classification of large flows and small
flows; it does not aim to estimate flow volumes or identify the medium flows,
which several prior approaches achieve. In addition to theoretical analysis,
we evaluate EARDet using extensive simulations based on real traffic traces.
We demonstrate that existing approaches suffer from high error rates under
DoS attacks, whereas EARDet can effectively detect large flows in the face
of both flooding and burst DoS attacks [41, 43].
Our main contributions in this chapter are as follows:
• We propose a deterministic streaming algorithm that is exact outside
an ambiguity region regardless of the input traffic. Two novel settings
distinguish EARDet from previous work: it monitors flows over ar-
bitrary windows, and supports exact detection outside an ambiguity
region.
• We rigorously prove the two guarantees – catching all large flows and
protecting all small flows – without making assumptions about the
input traffic.
• Our numerical analysis shows EARDet can operate at 40 Gbps high-
speed links using only hundreds of bytes of on-chip SRAM, substan-
tially smaller than the memory consumption in many existing systems.
We also provide guidelines on how to configure EARDet to satisfy
requirements of specific applications.
• We compare EARDet with two closely related proposals [2, 17] via
comparative analysis and extensive simulations based on real and syn-
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thetic traffic traces. The results confirm that these two are vulnerable
to attack flows that manipulate the input traffic, while EARDet con-
sistently catches all large flows without misclassifying small flows.
3.2 Problem Definition
To make progress in large-flow detection, our goal is to design an efficient
arbitrary-window-based large flow algorithm which is exact outside an am-
biguity window. In this section, we present our novel model and clarify our
goals.
3.2.1 Exact-Outside-Ambiguity-Region Large-Flow Problem
Large, medium, and small flows. To formulate the large-flow problem
that is exact-outside-ambiguity-region, we re-define the flows as follows. For
a flow f , it is judged as a large flow, if there exists a time window [t1, t2)
over which the volume of f , vol(f, t1, t2) is higher than the high-bandwidth
threshold function THh(t2 − t1); the flow f is judged as a small flow, if flow
f ’s volume vol(f, t1, t2) over all the possible time window [t1, t2) is lower than
a low-bandwidth threshold TH`(t2 − t1). The rest of flows are considered as
flows in an ambiguity region, which we call medium flows.
Considering the arbitrary window model, we defined the threshold function
based on the leaky bucket model: THh(t) = γht + βh and TH`(t) = γ`t + β`,
where γh > γ` > 0 and βh > β` > 0.
Exactness outside an ambiguity region. Instead of considering ineffi-
cient exact approaches, we propose a relaxed notion of exactness as follows:
Definition 1 Given a packet stream, the large-flow problem of exactness
outside an ambiguity region returns a set of flows F such that (1) F contains
every large flow, and (2) F does not contain any small flow.1
According to the definition above, we also define a positive as a flow that is
inserted into F , a negative is a flow that is not inserted into F . Therefore, we
1The Definition 1 is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1] c©2014 Association
for Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
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Figure 3.1: A general framework for a large-flow-detection algorithm. The
detection algorithm processes incoming flows and keeps limited states in
memory. Results may be reported to a remote server for further analysis [1].
have: (1) False Positive of small flows (FPs) means the detection algorithm
added small flows into F by mistake; and (2) False Negative of large flows
(FN`) means the detection algorithm fails to add large flows into F .
This novel exactness model is reasonable, because the damage caused by
large flows is confined by it, and the medium flows can still be handled by ex-
isting approaches (e.g. sample and hold algorithm [2], Sampled Netflow [31],
etc.).
One thing necessary to mention is that the size of flow set F is increasing
indefinitely over time, thus such a large-flow detection algorithm usually
periodically reports results to some report servers with a large amount of
storage to maintain a copy of F , as demonstrated in Figure 3.1.2 Therefore
such a large-flow detection algorithm has to correctly make responses without
knowledge from the flow set F .
3.2.2 Design Goal
Exactness outside an ambiguity region. We want to design a deter-
ministic large-flow detector which can accurately identify every large flow
(including the bursty flow) (i.e. no-FN`) and never wrongly judges a small
flow as a large flow (i.e. no-FPs) with any input traffic or attack pattern (i.e.
we make no assumption on the input traffic).
2Figure 3.1 is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1] c©2014 Association for
Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
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Scalability. In front of a high rate link, the large-flow detector should
maintain a low per-packet operation and small router state so that the al-
gorithm can be implemented in some fast but scarce storage devices (e.g.
on-chip cache) regardless of the input traffic and attack pattern.
Fast detection. To minimize the collateral damage, we desire that the
large-flow detector can catch the large flow as soon as possible once it violates
the high-bandwidth threshold. Thus, for a large flow which violates the high-
bandwidth threshold over [t1, t2), the detector should be able to detect this
flow before an upper bound time t2 + tprocess, where the tprocess is the time
needed in processing a packet.
3.3 Algorithm
According to design goals described in Section 3.2.2, we proposes EARDet,
an arbitrary-window-based algorithm, which resolves the large-flow problem
with exactness outside an ambiguity window. Inspired by the MG algo-
rithm [18], EARDet takes the no-FN` advantage of the MG algorithm and
extends it from the landmark window model to the arbitrary window model.
Moreover, EARDet achieve the no-FPs property with only processing pack-
ets in one pass. Interestingly, despite such amazing properties achieved by
EARDet, it only needs some simple modifications over the original MG
algorithm.
3.3.1 EARDet Overview
At the high level, EARDet has the following three main differences com-
pared to the MG algorithm:
Virtual traffic. Different from frequent-item finding, the large-flow prob-
lem works on each time slot in the link. Hence, we should not only consider
the real packets, but also the idle time gap between two consecutive pack-
ets. In EARDet, we virtually fill these idle time gaps with virtual traffic.
The virtual flows in the virtual traffic are designed as small flows to avoid
unnecessary alarms.
Blacklist. We maintain a local blacklist L in EARDet to keep the re-
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cently identified large flows. The main reason to use the blacklist is to avoid
increasing a counter of a flow when the counter value has reached a counter
threshold, βTH . Once a counter exceeds βTH , EARDet moves the associated
flow to the blacklist, and the counter will no longer be updated by the flows
in the blacklist. In paper by Wu et al. [1], we have some techniques to bound
the size of the blacklist to avoid spending too many resources on blacklist.
Counter threshold. As described above, each counter has a threshold
βTH to limit the value. The flows exceeding the threshold will be sent to the
blacklist, which enable us to confine the size of each counter by the upper
bound of βTH + α, where the α is the maximum packet size.
3.3.2 Algorithm Description
We show how EARDet works in Algorithm 1.3 In the algorithm, we treat a
packet (including virtual packets) of w size as w uni-size items, and apply a
mechanism similar to the one in the MG algorithm to increase and decrease
the n counters which are indexed by flow identifiers. There are at most n
non-zero counters (the set of non-zero counters is denoted as C), and each
counter is at most associated with a flow at the same time. We use S in the
algorithm to denote the state of the counters.
To clearly illustrate Algorithm 1, we introduce an example in Figure 3.24
to show details of how EARDet updates its status (i.e. counters). At the
beginning of the example, there is an empty counter, hence when flow g
with a size of 2 arrives, EARDet assigns the empty counter to flow g and
increases it by 2. Then, when flow b comes to EARDet, its size is added
to the counter associated with flow b, so that the value of flow b’s counter
violates the threshold hold βTH and flow b is added into blacklist L. At this
time, flow b will not be considered for increasing or decreasing the counter
anymore. Then, since no empty counters remain, each counter decreases by
the size of flow e’s packet. At last, EARDet treats the virtual traffic as two
packets with a size of 3 and reaches the final state.
3This algorithm is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1].
4Figure 3.2 is taken from the paper written by Wu et al. [1] c©2014 Association for
Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
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Algorithm 1 EARDet [1]
1: Initialization (S ← Init(n), Line 8-9)
2: for each packet x in the stream do
3: if x’s FID f is not blacklisted (f /∈ L) then
4: Update counters for virtual traffic (Line 18-22)
5: Update counters for x (S ← Update(S, x), Line 10-17)
6: if detect violation (Detect(S, x) == 1, Line 21-22) then
7: Add f to blacklist (L ← L ∪ {f})
8: Initialization, Init(n)
9: initialize all counters to zeros, L ← ∅, C ← ∅
10: Update counters for packet x, Update(S, x)
11: if x’s FID f is kept (f ∈ C) then
12: Update f ’s counter by the packet size w (cf ← cf + w)
13: else if less than n counters are kept (|C| < n) then
14: Set f ’s counter to w (cf ← w, C ← C ∪ {f})
15: else
16: Decrease all counters by d = min{w,minj∈C cj}
17: Set cf to w − d, and ∀j remove j from C if cj = 0
18: Update counters for virtual traffic between xi and xi−1
19: Compute the virtual traffic size, v (v = ρtidle−size(xi−1), and tidle = time(xi)−
time(xi−1))
20: For each unit u in the virtual traffic, update counters as if u belongs to a new
flow (e.g., unit is 1 byte)
21: Detect violation, Detect(S, x)
22: Return whether x’s flow counter exceeds threshold (cf > βTH)
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Figure 3.2: Example of updating EARDet status, βTH = 10, α = 3, and
n = 3 [1].
3.3.3 Optimization in Data Structure
To make EARDet efficient and scalable, we must do some optimization to
reduce the counter access. A naive implementation of EARDet has to ac-
cess each counter once a packet passes through the system, and access each
counter numerous times for processing virtual packets if we use 1 byte as the
virtual packet size. We are not able to afford such computation consump-
tion in high-speed links, e.g. backbone links. Therefore, we optimize our
algorithm as follows.
Balanced binary search tree. To save computation consumption in
EARDet, the first thing we need to do is to have a proper data structure
which can support insertion, deletion, and retrieval of the minimum counter
among all counters. A balanced binary search tree is a good choice in this
case, because it can achieve these operations in O(log n) time.
Float ground for decrement operation. To avoid retrieving and de-
creasing all counters when one packet arrives, we consider the counter value
relative to floating ground cground instead of recording the absolute counter
values. In this way, once a packet comes in, we do not have to decrease
each counters, but just need to elevate the floating ground. Finally, to judge
whether the counter exceeds the threshold, we only need to check whether
cf − cground > βBF is true. To prevent overflow in counters, we periodically
reset the floating ground to zero and accordingly reduce the value of each
counter.
Efficiently process virtual flows. As mentioned, if we set the packet
size too small for flow virtual flows, we are going to update the counters too
many times. We noticed that we actually expect to divide virtual traffic to
multiple virtual flows to make virtual flows comply with the low-bandwidth
19
threshold (i.e. we will not mistake virtual flows as large flows), meanwhile
we want to minimize the packet processing cost for virtual flows.
Thus, the maximum packets size is the counter threshold βTH bytes. Be-
cause the counter threshold βTH has to be larger than minimum packet size
(i.e. 40 bytes), the overhead is bounded by that of the worst case when the
link is congested by minimum-sized packets.
Implement counters with integers. To make the system more efficient,
we use integers to implement counters rather than using float numbers. In
this way, we not only save storage space but also modify counters faster.
However, we should be careful here, because the size of virtual traffic is not
always an integer. For example, for a link with 800 Mbps capacity and an
idle interval 1 ns, we have 0.1 byte virtual traffic. To handle this issue,
we have a little change in our thresholds: EARDet can catch all large
flows violating THh(t) = γht + (βh + 1) and no false positive for small flows
complying TH`(t) = γ`t + (βh − 1). We derive the proof sketch from Wu et
al.’s paper [1].
Proof sketch: We bound such biases with a slightly modified algorithm
that adjusts virtual traffic. Let us use {v1, v2, · · · } to denote the sizes of
a sequence of virtual traffic and {v′1, v′2, · · · } to denote the adjusted sizes.
We maintain an extra field called “carryover”, co, which keeps the amount
of uncounted virtual traffic. The co is initialized to zero, and we ensure
that −0.5 ≤ co < 0.5 all the time. Virtual flows are adjusted such that
v′i ← [vi + coi] and coi+1 ← coi + vi − v′i where coi is the value of co before
proceeding vi. By construction, v
′
is are all integers, and for any a, b, |
∑b
a vi−∑b
a v
′
i| = |cob+1− coa| ≤ 1. In other words, the adjusted virtual traffic differs
from the original one by at most 1 unit for any time interval. Consequently,
the modified algorithm guarantees catching flows that violate THh(t) = γht+
(βh + 1) and guarantees not catching any flow that conforms to TH`(t) =
γ`t+ (βh − 1). [1] 
Run EARDet in parallel. A straightforward way to scale a large-flow
detection algorithm is to parallelize it with multiple detectors. We could
randomly distribute the input flows into k EARDet, and each EARDet
detector only has approximately 1/k of overhead. However, this approach
also has some drawbacks: (1) it may not be able to evenly distribute over-
head, because 1/k flows does not mean 1/k packets; and (2) randomness
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weakens the deterministic property, so attackers could manipulate the flows
based on the random seed to escape detection.
3.4 Algorithm Analysis
In this section, we analyzed the unique properties in EARDet, and the-
oretically proved them. Moreover, we analyzed the tradeoff in the tuning
parameters of EARDet. Please refer to the List of Symbols to understand
the notation used in the analysis.
In the analysis, we consider an n-counter EARDet is running over a
network link and its link capacity is ρ. We use βTH to denote the threshold
of the counter, and use α as the maximum packet size. Thus, βTH +α is the
maximum possible value of each counter. Table 3.1 summarizes the notations
used in this section.
Table 3.1: Table of Notations.
Network management parameters:
ρ , Rate of link capacity
α , Maximum packet size
tupincb , Upper bound of tincb for any large flows
TH` , Low-bandwidth threshold
THh , High-bandwidth threshold
γ`, β` , Rate and burst for low-bandwidth threshold
γh , Rate for high-bandwidth threshold
Tunable parameters:
n , Number of counters in EARDet
βTH , Threshold of counters(> β`)
Parameters that depend on tunable parameters:
βh , Burst for high-bandwidth threshold
β∆ , βTH − β`
Other notation:
R(t1, t2) , Average flow rate in [t1, t2)
tincb , Incubation period of large flows
RNFN , No-FN` rate
RNFP , No-FPs rate
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3.4.1 Property 1: No False Negative on Large Flows
To analyze the false negative issue of this filter, we consider the performance
of our filter under the worst case (namely, the best case for the attacker).
To have the worst case for us, the attackers expect their counter’s value can
decrease as much as possible to make the attacker’s flow have the smallest
possibility to be caught by the filter.
To consider the decrement of the counters, firstly, we describe all the ways
to decrease and increase the value counters:
1. When the incoming flows are virtual flows and there are l empty coun-
ters in the filter, then, in time interval t, the decrement is ρ
l+1
t on all
counters, and the increment is 0 (l = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., n).
2. When the incoming flows are new real flows and there is no empty
counter in the filter, then, in time interval t the decrement is ρt on all
counters and the increment is 0. (This is the same as the first situation
when l = 0.) The new real flows means there is no associated counter
in the filter for this flow.
3. When the incoming flows are old real flows, or new real flows and there
are some empty counters, then, in time interval t, the decrement is 0
and the increment is ρ t on one counter. The old real flow means there
is an associated counter in the filter for this flow.
Thus, in the first and second situations, when there are l empty counters
in the filter, the decrement is always ρ
l+1
t in the interval of t; and in the third
situation, the increment is always ρ t in the interval of t. The increment and
decrement cannot happen at the same time.
We proved Lemma 2 as follow, and the proof sketch of it is in Appendix A.1.3.
Lemma 2 In any time interval [t1, t2], the upper bound of decrement of all
the counters is ρ
n+1
· (t2 − t1) + α + βTH .5
With Lemma 2, we proved that EARDet can detect any large flows which
violate the high-bandwidth threshold. We theoretically proved this property
and conclude it in the following theorem.
5Lemma 2 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
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Theorem 3 No-FN` property. EARDet detects every flow violating
the high-bandwidth threshold THh(t) = γht+βh over a time window of length
t, when γh ≥ RNFN = ρn+1 and βh ≥ α + 2βTH .6
Proof sketch: According to Lemma 2, in time interval [t1, t2], the decre-
ment of a counter will not exceed ρ
n+1
· (t2 − t1) + α + βTH . Because any
flow cannot be associated with two or more counters at the same time,
therefore, in any [t1, t2], for any flow f passing the filter the decrement
decf <
ρ
n+1
· (t2 − t1) + α + βTH . Thus, if there is a flow f with rate of
R(t), and it violates the high-bandwidth threshold, then:
ˆ t2
t1
R(t) dt ≥ THh(t2 − t1) ≥ ρ
n+ 1
(t2 − t1) + α + 2βTH (3.1)
Then, the remaining value of f ’s counter is:
Remains =
ˆ t2
t1
R(t) dt− decf > βTH (3.2)
Because βTH is the threshold of the filter, the flow f will be caught before
time t2. Therefore, for any flow which violates the high-bandwidth threshold,
it will be caught by the filter. Namely, there is no false negative in the filter
on detecting the flows violating the high-bandwidth threshold. Thus, this
theorem is proved now. 
Another way to prove Theorem 3 is presented in Wu et al.’s paper [1].
From Theorem 3, EARDet can be applied to enforce that all flows vi-
olating the high-bandwidth threshold, THh(t) = γht + βh, where γh =
ρ
n+1
and βh = α + 2βTH , will be caught by the filter and cut off. In this way, we
can largely protect a network link from the large-flow attack and the burst
attack, especially when the number of attackers (or attack flows) is fewer
than n. That means, if the attackers want to attack this link successfully,
they should have more than n machines to send floods. Therefore, this filter
effectively limits the DoS attacks.
6Theorem 3 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
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3.4.2 Property 2: No False Positive on Small Flows
EARDet will not wrongly catch any small flow complying the low-bandwidth
threshold. To demonstrate this point, we first proposed Lemma 4 [1] as fol-
lows. The proof of this lemma is in Appendix A.1.4.
Lemma 4 For any small flow f that complies with the low-bandwidth thresh-
old (i.e., TH`(t) = γ` t+β`), once the flow f is associated to a counter at t1,
this counter will always be lower than βTH after time t1 + tβ`, if the counter
is occupied by the same flow as the flow f , where tβ` =
(n−1)α+(n+1)β`
[1−(n+1)γ`/ρ]ρ .
7
Then, we proposed Theorem 5 [1] which illustrates the property of no false
positives on small flows.
Theorem 5 No-FPs property. EARDet will not catch any flow com-
plying with the low-bandwidth threshold TH`(t) = γ`t+β` for all time windows
of length t, when 0 < β` < βTH , γ` < RNFP , RNFP =
β∆
(n−1)α+(n+1)β`+(n+1)β∆ ·
ρ.8
Proof sketch: According to Lemma 4, to avoid catching a small flow f ,
the counter should be smaller than βTH before tβ` . Hence, we choose a γ` to
achieve γ` tβ` + β` < βTH . Then,
(n−1)α+(n+1)β`
[1−(n+1)γ`/ρ]ρ <
βTH−β`
γ`
,
⇔ γ` < β∆
(n− 1)α+ (n+ 1)β` + (n+ 1)β∆ · ρ (3.3)
The theorem is proved. 
3.4.3 Property 3: Large-Flow Incubation Period
Considering a large flow f violates a high-bandwidth threshold over time
window [t1, t2), we assume the detection is triggered by the packet at ta.
Then, we define the incubation period as ta − t1, where ta ≤ t2 is due to the
no-FN` property of EARDet. According to theoretical analysis, we proved
there is an upper bound of the incubation period for the large flow. The
upper bound depends on the rate of the large flow over [t1, t2).
7Lemma 4 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
8Theorem 5 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
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Theorem 6 For the flow f which violates THh(t) over some time window
[t1, t2), if its average rate R(t1, ta) is larger than Ratk in the time interval of
[t1, ta) (Ratk is a constant rate larger than RNFN =
ρ
n+1
), then f ’s incubation
period is bounded by tincb <
α+2βTH
Ratk− ρn+1
.9
Proof sketch:10 Because R(t1, ta) > Ratk, intuitively the tincb of flow with
an average rate of R(t1, ta) must be shorter than the t
′
incb of flow with a rate
of Ratk. That is, tincb < t
′
incb.
Assume a flow f ′ with rate Ratk will violate THh(t) over time window
[t′1, t
′
2), then
Ratk(t
′
2 − t′1) =
ρ
n+ 1
(t′2 − t′1) + α+ 2βTH
⇒ tincb < t′incb = t′a − t′1 ≤ t′2 − t′1 =
α+ 2βTH
Ratk − ρn+1
(3.4)
Thus, the theorem is proved. 
3.4.4 Property 4: Deterministic Performance
The proofs of the three properties above do not make any assumptions on the
input traffic, which means EARDet will keep these properties regardless of
the type of the input traffic or attack pattern. The attackers are not able to
escape the detection through manipulating the flows and playing with timing.
Thus, we say EARDet provides deterministic performance over large-flow
detection.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the theoretical analysis and real-traffic simulation
results of EARDet and another two related large-flow detection algorithms,
Fixed-window-based Multistage Filters (FMF) [2] and Arbitrary-window-
based Multistage Filters (AMF) [17], to evaluate performance of EARDet.
In terms of the exactness outside the ambiguity region, the evaluation shows
9Theorem 6 is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
10The proof sketch is taken from Wu et al.’s paper [1].
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that EARDet outperforms the prior work in both large rate flow detection
and burst flow detection.
3.5.1 Theoretical Evaluation
As introduced in Section 2.2.2, multistage filter maintains an array of coun-
ters to record the size of flows. For an incoming flow, the filter will hash map
the flow identifier to a counter in the array, and whenever a packet of this
flow arrives in the filter, we increase the counter by the size of the packet.
Once the value of the counter exceeds the threshold of a large flow, multi-
stage filter catches all flows associated to this counter as a large flow. The
difference between AMF and FMF is that AMF uses leaky buckets instead
of regular counters.
We can easily observe that FMF and AMF have no false negative over
large flows, because if a flow is a large flow, its counter must exceed the large
flow threshold. However, there are some false positives resulting from these
two algorithms. For example, if a large flow and a small flow are mapped to
the same counter, the small flow will be detected as a large flow too. To lower
the false positive rate, FMF and AMF must increase the number of counters.
But this introduces more overhead in storage space. To understand the
performance of three large-flow detector algorithms, we present a concrete
example here. Considering the case with γh = 1%ρ, γl = 0.1%ρ, where ρ
is the link capacity. The performance of three detectors are described in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Numerical Example for FMF, AMF, and EARDet.
Detector Number of Counters (n) Rate of FPs Rate of FN`
EARDet 101 0 0
FMF 101 no guarantee 0∗
FMF 1000 ≤ 0.04∗ 0∗
AMF 101 no guarantee 0
AMF 2000 ≤ 0.04 0
∗The result for FMF is not applicable for large burst flows. Because FMF is
based on the landmark window model, it provides no guarantee for
detecting large burst flows.
Table 3.2 shows that with the same amount of memory space thatEARDet
uses (i.e. 101 counters), FMF and AMF cannot guarantee there will be no
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false positives for small flows at all; on the contrary, EARDet can guar-
antee both no false positives for small flows and no false negatives for large
flows. Even using 10x (20x) memory, FMF (AMF) can only guarantee a 0.04
false positive rate for small flows. Moreover, as we mentioned, FMF has no
guarantee for large burst flows, however, EARDet and AMF are able to
guarantee this. To make the result clearer, we summarize the comparison
result in Table 3.3. We say FMF and AMF are not deterministic, because
they are dependent on input traffic that can be manipulated by an attacker
to result in false positives.
Table 3.3: Comparison Summary for FMF, AMF, and EARDet.
Detector Storage Cost No-FPs No-FN` Deterministic
EARDet low guarantee no guarantee yes
FMF high no guarantee no guarantee no
AMF high no guarantee guarantee no
3.5.2 Experimental Evaluation Environment
Traffic datasets. To make the experiment more convincing, we use real
network traffic datasets Federico II [44–46] and CAIDA [47], and we use the
first 30 seconds of traffic to run FMF, AMF, and EARDet. Under the flow
ID defined by the pair of source IP and destination IP, we summarize each
dataset as follows:
• Federico II dataset contains 2911 flows which are collected from a 200
Mbps link. The average link rate is 1.85 MB/s and the average flow
size is around 19.9 KB.
• CAIDA dataset contains around 2.5 million flows from a 10 Gbps link.
The average link rate is about 280 MB/s and the average flow size is
about 3.3 KB.
Attack flows. To comprehensively evaluate performance of EARDet
compared to FMF and AMF, we artificially generated two kinds of attack
flows: flooding attack flows and shrew DoS attack flows [41,43], and mix the
generated attack flows with the real traffic as the experiment input traffic.
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Then we test (1) how many attack flows escape the detection, and (2) how
many legitimate flows are falsely caught as large flows.
Flooding attack flows are the flows with a high rate, thus we generate such
flows second by second. For each second interval, we randomly distribute
γlarge/packetSize packets in this one second, where γlarge is the flooding flow
rate. Then we do the same work for all 30 seconds.
Shrew DoS attack flows consist of some periodic bursts, and attackers use
such bursty traffic to block TCP traffic by exploiting the TCP congestion
control mechanism. To generate shrew DoS attack flows, we randomly pick
up an initial timestamp (from 0 to 29 seconds) for each flow, and then gener-
ate a burst with size γburst · lburst every T seconds, where γburst is the rate of
the burst traffic, the lburst is the duration of each burst, and T is the period
of the burst.
Configure EARDet. We configure EARDet’s parameters as shown in
Table 3.4. With this configuration, EARDet is able to catch all large flows
which violates the high-bandwidth threshold THh(t) = 0.01ρt + 15.5 KB,
while not hurting any legitimate flows which comply with the low-bandwidth
threshold TH`(t) = 0.001ρt+ 6072 B for flows in dataset Federico II. For the
dataset CAIDA, there is only a slight difference in βh, n, and tupincb. The
congested link status means the link is fully congested by flows; the non-
congested link status means the link still contains many idle time intervals.
For a detailed description about how to come up such parameters, please
refer the technical report by Wu et al. [48].
Table 3.4: Parameters of EARDet.
Parameters Federico II CAIDA
ρ 25 MB/s 1.25 GB/s
γh 250 KB/s 12.5 MB/s
βh 15.5 KB 15.4 KB
γ` 25 KB/s 1.25 MB/s
β` 6072 B 6072 B
α 1518 B 1518 B
βTH 6991 B 6991 B
n 107 100
tupincb 0.8370 sec 0.1242 sec
link status non-congested/congested non-congested
28
Table 3.5: Parameters of FMF.
Parameters Federico II CAIDA
b 55/250 55/250
d 2 2
n 110/500 110/500
T 250 KB 12.5 MB
Table 3.6: Parameters of AMF.
Parameters Federico II CAIDA
b 55/250 55/250
d 2 2
n 110/500 110/500
u 15.5 KB 15.4 KB
r 250 KB/s 12.5 MB/s
Configure FMF and AMF. We set the number of stages for FMF and
AMF as d = 2, and the number of counters in each stage as b = 250.
For FMF, we set the window size as 1 second, namely, it checks whether
the counter exceeds the threshold every second. Therefore, the threshold of
FMF is T = γh. For AMF, we set the leaky bucket threshold as u = βh and
the leaky bucket rate as r = γh. We are also interested in investigating how
these two large-flow detectors perform with the same amount of storage cost
used by EARDet, thus, we also consider the case that b = 55 and d = 2.
The configuration is summarized in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6.
3.5.3 Experimental Evaluation Results
We found that the experiment result of the experiments using CAIDA dataset
shows a similar result to the one of the experiments using Federico II, thus, we
just present the result of the experiments running with Federico II dataset.
To measure the performance of FMF, AMF, and EARDet, we mainly fo-
cus on three metrics: false positive probability for small flows, and detection
probability and incubation period for large flows. The false positive proba-
bility measures the probability for the detector to wrongly detect a small flow
as a large flow. The detection probability is the probability that a detector
can successfully catch large flows. The large-flow incubation period shows
the time needed to catch a large flow since the flow appears in the link.
29
To illustrate the experiment result, Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5(a)
to 3.5(h), and Figure 3.6 are taken from a paper written by Wu et al. [1]
c©2014 Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. by permission.
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Figure 3.6: Incubation period for large flows [1].
Figure 3.3 shows the detection probability of three detectors in front of
flooding DoS attack. We can see all of three flows can perfectly catch all
large flows which violate the large-flow threshold. However, FMF and AMF
cannot guarantee that there are no false positives all the time. Especially,
when the link is congested, FMF and AMF falsely caught a lot of flows below
the low-bandwidth threshold.
Figure 3.4 represents the detection probability of three detectors when
shrew DoS attack happens. As we expected, EARDet and AMF can catch
all bursty attack flows, however, FMF missed a lot of such attack flows
because it is only based on the fixed window model.
For false positive probability over small flows, we take a look at Fig-
ures 3.5(a) to 3.5(h). The result shows no false positives in the result
from EARDet. However FMF and AMF cannot avoid the false positives.
When FMF and AMF are using the same number of counters as used by
EARDet, we can find many false positives, especially in the congested link.
Figure 3.5(a) and Figure 3.5(b) indicate that in the congested link, FMF
suffers more 1% and 4% false positives under shrew DoS attack and flooding
DoS attack respectively. Increasing the number of counters can reduce the
false positives for FMF and AMF, but it is impossible to guarantee no false
positive.
The results also reflect that EARDet is deterministic regardless of what
input traffic is used. It is even more interesting that in the ambiguity region,
the curves of detection probability of EARDet are exactly the same. Maybe
we could discover more in the ambiguity region in the future.
Figure 3.6 perfectly supports Theorem 6. The figure shows that the maxi-
mum incubation period of attack flows is always below the theoretical upper
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bound no matter what the attack flow rate is. Moreover, we observed that
usually the maximum incubation period is much smaller than the theoretical
upper bound and the average incubation period is even much smaller.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we proposed EARDet, a novel arbitrary-window-based al-
gorithm, which is exact outside an ambiguity window. Inspired by the MG
algorithm, EARDet not only keeps the property of no false detection over
large flows exceeding a high-bandwidth threshold, but also achieves the no
false accusation on small flows complying a low-bandwidth threshold with
no assumption on the input traffic or attack pattern. We demonstrate this
both in theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation.
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CHAPTER 4
CLEF: LIMITING THE DAMAGE CAUSED
BY LARGE FLOWS IN THE INTERNET
CORE
4.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we aim to design algorithms to detect large flows in the
Internet core routers with high capacity, e.g. aggregate capacity of several
Terabits per second (Tbps). Thus, we require the algorithm to be highly
efficient and scalable.
Several approaches for large-flow detection have been proposed; they can
be categorized into deterministic (i.e., not relying on random sampling or
random binning) and probabilistic algorithms. Examples of deterministic al-
gorithms are EARDet [1] and Space Saving [32], while Sampled Netflow [31]
and Multistage Filters [2,17] are examples of probabilistic approaches. With
the increase of core router bandwidth, reducing overhead and increasing
efficiency of large-flow detection algorithms are critical. For example, for
EARDet to detect a 1 Mbps flow on a 100 Gbps link, it would require
105 counters on that link, which calls for specialized hardware to update the
counters on a per-packet basis. Furthermore, mechanisms that require per-
flow state, such as Netflow, may encounter as many as 107 flows across the
same 100 Gbps link. Maintaining 105 counters, including the IPv4 or IPv6
metadata,1 requires about 1.6–4 MB of state for each 100 Gbps of bandwidth.
Since the state has to be accessed for each data packet, the memory system
has to be highly optimized. In contrast, the scheme designed in this chapter
requires only 10 KB per 100 Gbps bandwidth, greatly reducing hardware
cost and complexity.
Because core routers process packets in hardware, and because the de-
signers of core routers add hardware as necessary to accomplish high-speed
1The IP metadata consists source and destination addresses, protocol number, and
ports. Thus, it requires about 16 bytes and 40 bytes per counter for IPv4 and IPv6,
respectively.
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processing, it is difficult to provide a conclusive upper bound on the com-
putation and memory that a core router can deploy across its links. Thus,
to analyze a budget for in-router memory, we consider three levels of mem-
ory requirement: the lowest level is the size of a commodity CPU L1 cache,
or about 32 KB; the intermediate level is the size of a commodity CPU L2
cache, or about 256 KB; the largest level is the size of a commodity CPU L3
cache, or about 8 MB.
With such a limited amount of memory, an argument based on the pigeon-
hole principle shows that flows cannot be consistently detected as soon as
they exceed certain large-flow thresholds. When the immediate detection of
large flows is not possible due to memory constraints, the goal should be to
minimize the damage caused to legitimate flows; in such an environment, it
is likely more important to rapidly catch very high-rate flows than it is to
quickly catch mildly misbehaving flows. Our damage model considers two
causes of packet loss: loss caused by large flows, and false positives that
punish legitimate flows.
Of particular importance in the damage metric is that an attacker can
perform bursty attacks with periodic traffic bursts. Our damage metric can
also reflect the damage caused by attacks such as the Shrew attack [49]
because we count every dropped legitimate packet.
In this chapter, we propose a hybrid scheme called CLEF, short for in-Core
Limiting of Egregious Flows, which combines the deterministic EARDet
mechanism for rapid detection of very large flows with a novel, randomized
algorithm, called Recursive Large-Flow Detection (RLFD), that eventually
detects large flows not caught by EARDet. Unlike existing detectors, RLFD
efficiently distinguishes large flows from legitimate flows by evaluating one
set of flows at a time, and recursively shrinking the set of suspected large
flows. Larger flows are detected with higher probability in RLFD, so the
expected detection time decreases in the level of overuse, resulting in limited
damage across a wide range of flow overuse amounts.
In this chapter, our main contributions are: the definition of a damage met-
ric to analyze the performance of large-flow detection; a novel, randomized
algorithm, RLFD, that provides eventual detection of persistently large flows
with very little memory cost; a hybrid detection scheme, CLEF, which offers
excellent large-flow detection properties with low resource requirements; and
the analysis of worst-case attacks against proposed large-flow detectors.
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4.2 Problem Definition
This chapter aims to design an efficient large-flow detection algorithm that
minimizes the damage caused by misbehaving flows. This section introduces
the challenges of large-flow detection and proposes a damage metric to com-
pare different large-flow detectors. We then define an adversary model in
which the adversary adapts its behavior to the detection algorithm in use.
4.2.1 Large-Flow Detection by Core Routers
In this work, we aim to design a large-flow detection algorithm that is viable
to run on Internet core routers. The algorithm needs to limit damage caused
by large flows even when handling worst-case background traffic. Such an
algorithm must satisfy these three requirements:
• Line rate: An in-core large-flow detection algorithm must operate at
the line rate of core routers, which can process several hundreds of
gigabits of traffic per second.
• Low memory: Large-flow detection algorithms will typically access
one or more memory locations for each traversing packet; such memory
must be high-speed (such as on-chip L1 cache). Additionally, such
memory is expensive and usually limited in size, and existing large-flow
detectors are inadequate to operate in high-bandwidth, low-memory
environments. An in-core large-flow detection algorithm should thus
be highly space-efficient. Though perfect detection requires counters
equal to the maximum number of simultaneous large flows (by the
pigeonhole principle [50]), our goal is to perform effective detection
with much fewer counters.
• Low damage: Because the overhead of exact detection (i.e., no false
positives and no false negatives) is excessive in our environment, our
schemes trade timely detection for space efficiency, aiming to limit the
impact of overusing flows. Section 4.2.2 introduces our damage metric,
which quantifies the impact of overuse on legitimate flows.
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4.2.2 Damage Metric
Rather than relying on memory-intensive exact enforcement algorithms, this
chapter considers the damage inflicted by a large flow before it is detected.
Specifically, we propose a new metric, which we call damage, to assess the
effectiveness of a large-flow detection algorithm. Intuitively, damage quan-
tifies the combined impact of large flows and detection-algorithm-induced
false positives on legitimate traffic (that is, traffic from flows other than
large flows).
In this chapter, we evaluate the damage metric over a link that is at ca-
pacity, such that any large-flow traffic causes packet loss. In general, damage
could be modified to contemplate links that are not at capacity, or traffic
of different priority classes. We thus characterize large-flow impact to be
equal to large-flow overuse. The damage metric, then, is large-flow overuse
(intuitively, the losses resulting from the large flow) plus false positives (in-
tuitively, the losses resulting from an incorrect detection by an erroneous
detection algorithm). Symbolically, our damage metric D = Dover + Dfp
where
• Overuse Damage (Dover): the total amount by which all large flows
exceed the flow specification.
• False Positive Damage (Dfp): the amount of legitimate traffic incor-
rectly blocked by the detection algorithm.
Relationship with other metrics. Previous work often uses false posi-
tive, false negative, and detection delay metrics; the damage metric reflects
these three, but is more expressive than each metric individually.
• False Positive (FP): a flow incorrectly detected as a large flow.
• False Negative (FN): a large flow missed by the detection algorithm.
• Detection Delay: the latency between a large flow’s first threshold-
exceeding packet and the detection of that flow.
Overuse damage reflects both FNs and detection delay; it also distinguishes
between flows that significantly exceed the flow specification and those that
barely exceed the flow specification. For example, if large flow A is much
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larger than large flow B, a missed detection on A or B results in the same
FN rate; however, the damage metric reflects the increased cost of missed
detection on the larger flow A. The damage metric elegantly unifies com-
mon metrics like FP, FN, and detection delay, simplifying the comparison of
detection algorithms.
4.2.3 Attacker Model
In our attacker model, we consider an adversary that aims to maximize dam-
age. Our attacker responds to the detection algorithm and tries to exploit its
transient behavior to avoid detection or to cause false detection of legitimate
flows.
Like Estan and Varghese’s work [2], we assume that attackers know about
the large-flow detection algorithm running in the router and its settings, but
have no knowledge of secret seeds used to generate random variables, such
as the detection intervals for landmark-window-based algorithms [2, 18–21,
23, 24, 32], and random numbers used for packet/flow sampling [2]. This
assumption prevents the attacker from optimal attacks against randomized
algorithms.
We assume the attacker can interleave packets, but is unable to spoof
legitimate packets (as discussed in Section 2.1) or create pre-router losses in
legitimate flows. Figure 4.1 shows the network model, where the attacker
arbitrarily interleaves attack traffic (A) between idle intervals of legitimate
traffic (L) and the router processes the interleaved traffic to generate output
traffic (O) and perform large-flow detection. Our model does not limit input
traffic, allowing for arbitrary volumes of attack traffic.
In our model, whenever a packet traverses a router, the large-flow detector
receives the flow ID (for example, the source and destination IP and port and
transport protocol), the packet size, and the timestamp at which the packet
arrived.
Router
(w/ Detector) O
…
Interleaving
…A
…L
Figure 4.1: Adversary model.
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4.3 Background and Challenges
In this section we briefly review some existing large-flow detection algorithms,
and discuss the motivations and challenges of combining multiple algorithms
into a hybrid scheme.
4.3.1 Existing Detection Algorithms
We review the three most relevant large-flow detection algorithms, summa-
rized in Table 4.1. We divide large flows into low-rate large flows and high-
rate large flows, depending on the amount by which they exceed the flow
specification.
EARDet. EARDet [1] guarantees exact and instant detection of all flows
exceeding a high-rate threshold γh =
ρ
m
, where ρ is the link capacity and
m is the number of counters. However, EARDet may fail to identify a flow
whose rate stays below γh.
Multistage Filters (AMF). Multistage filters [2, 17] consist of multiple
parallel stages, each of which is an array of counters. Specifically, arbitrary-
window-based Multistage Filter (AMF), as classified by Wu et al. [1], uses
leaky buckets as counters. AMF guarantees no-FN and immediate detection
for any flow specification; however, AMF has FPs, which increase as the link
becomes congested (as shown in Appendix B.1.2).
Flow Memory. Flow Memory (FM) [2] refers to per-flow monitoring
of select flows. FM is often used in conjunction with another system that
specifies which flows to monitor; when a new flow is to be monitored but the
flow memory is full, FM evicts an old flow. We follow Estan and Varghese [2]’s
random eviction. If the flow memory is large enough to avoid eviction, it
provides exact detection. In practice, however, FM is unable to handle a
large number of flows in the network, resulting in frequent flow eviction and
potentially high FN. The analysis in Appendix B.1.1 shows that FM’s real-
world performance depends on the amount by which a large flow exceeds the
flow specification: high-rate flows are more quickly detected, which improves
the chance of detection before eviction.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Three Existing Detection Algorithms. None of
Them Achieve All Desired Properties.
Algorithm EARDet AMF FM
No-FP yes no∗ yes
No-FN
Flat large flow
low-rate no∗∗ yes no∗
high-rate yes yes yes∗∗∗
Bursty large flow
low-rate no∗∗ yes no∗
high-rate yes yes yes∗∗∗
Instant detection yes yes yes
Deterministic yes no no
∗Appendix B.1.1 and B.1.2 show that FM has high FN and AMF has high FP
for low-rate large flows when memory is limited.
∗∗EARDet cannot provide no-FN when memory is limited.
∗∗∗FM has nearly zero FN when large-flow rate is high.
4.3.2 Advantages of Hybrid Schemes
As Table 4.1 shows, none of the detectors we examined can efficiently achieve
no-FN and no-FP across various types of large flows. However, different
detectors exhibit different strengths, so combining them could result in im-
proved performance.
One approach is to run detectors sequentially; in this composition, the first
detector monitors all traffic and sends any large flows it detects to a second
detector. However, this approach allows an attacker controlling multiple
flows to rotate overuse among many flows, overusing a flow only for as long
as it takes the first detector to react, then sending at the normal rate so that
remaining detectors remove it from their watch list and re-starting with the
attack.
Alternatively, we can run detectors in parallel: the hybrid detects a flow
whenever it is identified by either detector. (Another configuration is that
a flow is only detected if both detectors identify it, but such a configuration
would have a high FN rate compared to the detectors used in this chapter.)
The hybrid inherits the FPs of both schemes, but features the minimum
detection delay of the two schemes and has a FN only when both schemes
have a FN. The remainder of this chapter considers the parallel approach
that identifies a flow whenever it is detected by either detector.
The existing EARDet and FM schemes have no FPs and are able to quickly
detect high-rate flows; because high-rate flows cause damage much more
quickly, rapid detection of high-rate flows is important to achieving low dam-
40
age. Combining EARDet or FM with a scheme capable of detecting low-rate
flows as a hybrid detection scheme can retain rapid detection of high-rate
flows while eventually catching (and thus limiting the damage of) low-rate
flows. In this chapter, we aim to construct such a scheme. Specifically,
our scheme will selectively monitor one small set at a time, ensuring that a
consistently overusing flow is eventually detected.
4.4 RLFD Algorithm and CLEF Hybrid Scheme
In this section, we present our new large-flow detectors. First, we describe
the Recursive Large-Flow Detection (RLFD), a novel approach, which is de-
signed to use very little memory but provide eventual detection for large
flows, and present the data structures, runtime analysis, and advantages and
disadvantages of RLFD. Next, we develop a hybrid detector, CLEF, that
addresses the disadvantages of RLFD by combining it with the previously
proposed EARDet [1]. CLEF uses EARDet to rapidly detect high-rate
flows and RLFD to detect low-rate flows, thus limiting the damage caused
by large flows, even with a very limited amount of memory.
4.4.1 RLFD Algorithm
RLFD is a randomized algorithm designed to perform memory-efficient de-
tection of low-rate large flows; it is designed to scale to a large number of
flows, as encountered by an Internet core router. RLFD is designed to limit
the damage inflicted by low-rate large flows while using very limited mem-
ory. The intuition behind RLFD is to monitor subsets of flows, recursively
subdividing the subset deemed most likely to contain a large flow. By divid-
ing subsets in this way, RLFD exponentially reduces memory requirements
(monitoring md flows with O(m+ d) memory).
The main challenges addressed by RLFD include efficiently mapping flows
into recursively divided groups, choosing the correct subdivision to reduce
detection delay and FNs, and configuring RLFD to guarantee the absence of
FPs.
Recursive subdivision. To operate on extremely limited memory, RLFD
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Figure 4.2: RLFD structure and example.
recursively subdivides monitored flows into m groups, and subdivides only
the one group most likely to contain a large flow.
We can depict an RLFD as a virtual counter tree2 (Figure 4.2(a)) of depth
k. Every non-leaf node in this tree has m children, each of which corresponds
to a virtual counter. The tree is a full m-ary try of depth d, though at any
moment, only one node (m counters) is kept in memory; the rest of the tree
exists only virtually.
Each flow f is randomly assigned to a path PATH(f) of counters on the
virtual tree, as illustrated by the highlighted counters in Figure 4.2(b). This
mapping is determined by hashing the flow ID with a keyed hash function,
where the key is randomly generated by each router. Section 4.4.2 explains
how RLFD efficiently implements this random mapping.
Since there are d levels, each leaf node at level Ld will contain an average
of n/md−1 flows, where n is the total number of flows on the link. A flow f
is identified as a large flow if it is the only flow associated with its counter
at level Ld and the counter value exceeds a threshold THRLFD. Section 4.4.2
describes how to configure RLFD to guarantee no-FP and low detection delay.
We choose d ≥ dlogm ne so that a leaf node is likely to contain a single flow.
RLFD considers only one node in the virtual counter tree at a time, so
it requires only m counters. To enable exploration of the entire tree, RLFD
divides the process into d periods; in period k, it loads one tree node from
2The terms “counter tree” and “virtual counter” are also used by Chen et al. [35], but
our technique differs in both approach and goal. Chen et al. efficiently manage a sufficient
number of counters for per-flow accounting, while RLFD manages an insufficient number
of counters to detect consistent bad behavior.
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level Lk. Though these periods need not be of equal length, in this chapter
we consider periods of equal length T`, which results in a RLFD detection
cycle Tc = d · T`.
RLFD always chooses the root node to monitor at level L1; after moni-
toring at level Lk, RLFD identifies the largest counter Cmax among the m
counters at level Lk, and uses the node corresponding to that counter for
level Lk+1. Section 4.5.3 shows that choosing the largest counter detects
large flows with high probability.
Figure 4.2(c) shows an example with m = 4 counters, n = 7 flows, and
d = 2 levels. fL is a low-rate large flow. In level L1, the largest counter is the
one associated with large flow fL and legitimate flows f2 and f6. At level L2,
the flow set {fL, f2, f6} is selected and sub-divided. After the second round,
fL is detected because it violates the counter value threshold THRLFD.
Algorithm description. As shown in Figure 4.3(a), the algorithm starts
at the top level L1 so each counter represents a child of the root node. At
the beginning of each period, all counters are reset to zero. At the end of
each period, the algorithm finds the counter holding the maximum value and
moves to the corresponding node, so each counter in the next period is a
child of that node. Once the algorithm has processed level d, it repeats from
the first level.
Figure 4.3(b) describes how RLFD processes each incoming packet. When
RLFD receives a packet x from flow f , x is dropped if f is in the blacklist
(a table that stores previously found large flows). If f is not in the blacklist,
RLFD hashes f to the corresponding counters in the virtual counter tree
(one counter per level of the tree). If one such counter is currently loaded in
memory, its value is increased by the size of the packet x. At the bottom level
Ld, a large flow is identified when there is only one flow in the counter and
the counter value exceeds the threshold THRLFD. To increase the probability
that a large flow is in a counter by itself, we choose d ≥ dlogm ne and use
Cuckoo hashing [51] at the bottom level to reduce collisions (as described in
Section 4.4.2).
• Hashing to Counters. RLFD hashes each packet’s flow ID to one
virtual counter at each level of the virtual counter tree. Each incoming
packet must be hashed so that RLFD can determine whether the flow
is monitored in the current time period. Though a na¨ıve approach
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Figure 4.3: RLFD Decision Diagrams. “V.C.” stands for virtual counter.
would be to perform one hash for each level (total run time of O(d)),
we propose an O(1) implementation in Section 4.4.2.
• Counter Threshold. To reflect the flow specification TH(t) = γt+ β
from Section 2.1, we set THRLFD = γT` + β, where T` is the duration
of the period during which detection is performed at the bottom level
Ld. Any flow sending more traffic than THRLFD during any duration of
time T` must violate the large-flow threshold TH(t), so RLFD has no
FPs.
• Blacklist. As in EARDet [1], RLFD includes a blacklist to record
detected large flows for future analysis and action. We calculate the
damage D with the assumption that CLEF blocks large flows right
after they are put into the blacklist.
4.4.2 RLFD Data Structure and Optimization
In this section, we describe how to efficiently implement RLFD and propose
additional optimizations to the basic RLFD described in Section 4.4.1.
Hashing and counter checking. Hashing each flow f into a path of
virtual counters PATH(f) and checking whether any of these counters are
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loaded in the memory are two performance-critical operations of RLFD.
For each packet, our implementation only requires three bitwise operations
(a hash operation, a bitwise AND operation, and a comparison over 64 bits),
thus requiring only O(1) time and O(1) space on a modern 64-bit CPU.
A naive implementation of hashing could introduce unnecessary cost in
computation and space. For example, a naive implementation may maintain
one hash function per virtual counter array. To check whether an incoming
flow needs to be monitored, it needs to check whether the incoming flow
is hashed into every maximum-value counter in each level above the current
level. However, this took O(d) time for checking level by level and O(d) space
for hash functions, where d is the depth of the virtual counter tree. O(d)
computational complexity per packet is too high due to the limited number
of per-packet memory access in a typical modern CPU.
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|𝒂𝟎𝒂𝟏𝒂𝟐…𝒂𝒔2𝟏 …𝒂𝒔 𝒌2𝟐 … 𝒂𝒔 𝒌2𝟏 2𝟏 𝟎𝟎… 𝟎𝟎𝟎|
For 𝑳𝟏𝐀(𝒍𝒊,𝒌) ≜ For 𝑳𝒌2𝟏
𝑯(𝒇)AND 𝑴(𝑳𝒌) = 𝐀(𝒍𝒊,𝒌)≠ 𝐀(𝒍𝒊,𝒌) f’s V.C. is in the loaded counter array 𝒍𝒊,𝒌f’s V.C. is not in the loaded counter array 𝒍𝒊,𝒌
Figure 4.4: RLFD counter hash and in-memory check. H(f) reflects the
hash-generated bin number for all levels, M(Lk) reflects a mask that
includes the first k − 1 levels, and A(li,k) reflects the bins selected in each of
the first k − 1 levels. Flow f is in the i, k counter array exactly when H(f)
& M(Lk) = A(li,k).
Inspired by how a network router finds the subnet of an IP address, as
Figure 4.4 illustrates, we map a flow to a virtual counter per level based on a
single hash value. Specifically, given an incoming flow f , we compute H(f),
and then do a bitwise AND operation of H(f) and a mask value M(Lk) of
the current level Lk. We then check whether the result is equal to the hash
value A(`i,k) of the current loaded counter array `i,k (the ith counter array in
the kth level). If the H(f) AND M(Lk) = A(`i,k), then the virtual counter
of f in the level Lk is in the currently loaded counter array `i,k.
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Assuming RLFD has d levels and m counters in each counter array, we
hash a flow ID f = fid(x) into H(f) with s · d bits, where s = log2m. We
require the system designer to only choose the base-2 exponential value for
m, so that the s is an integer.
The bits [bs(k−1) : bsk−1] 3 of H(f) is the index of the virtual counter in its
counter array in the kth level Lk. As each counter array is determined by
its ancestor counters as Figure 4.2(b) describes, the bits [b0 : bs(k−1)−1] can
uniquely determine the counter array in the level Lk for the flow f . Thus,
to check whether the virtual counters of a flow is in memory, we just need
to track the ancestor counters of the currently loaded counter array li,k. We
track the ancestor counters by A(`i,k), which is also a value of s · d bits. The
bits [a0 : as(k−1)−1] record the index of ancestor counters of `i,k, and the rest
of bits are all 0s. To track A(`i,k), we just simply set the bits [as(k−1) : ask−1]
as the index of the selected counter at the end of the period of Lk. The mask
value for the level Lk is also a value of s · d bits, whose first s(k− 1) bits are
1s and the rest are 0s. By H(fid(x)) AND M(Lk), we extract the ancestor
bits [b0 : bs(k−1)−1] of the flow fid(x), and compare it with the ancestor bits
[a0 : as(k−1)−1] of the loaded counter array. If they match, then the flow
fid(x)’s counter is in the memory, and we update the counter with index
[bs(k−1) : bsk−1] by the size of the packets of the flow fid(x).
For each packet, our implementation above only needs three bitwise oper-
ations: a hash operation, an AND operation, and a comparison over d log2m
bits. Although the number of bits used in this implementation depends on d
and m, a 64-bit long integer is enough in most of the cases, thus those bitwise
operations only take O(1) CPU cycles in a modern 64-bit CPU. Therefore,
we say this implementation only takes O(1) time and O(1) space.
Hash function update. We update the keyed hash function by choosing
a new key at the beginning of every initial level to guarantee that the counter
assignments between each top-to-bottom detection cycle are approximately
independently random. For simplicity, in this chapter we analyze RLFD
with uniformly random hash functions. Picking a new key is computationally
inexpensive and needs to be performed only once per cycle.
Blacklist. When RLFD identifies a large flow, the flow’s ID should be
added to the blacklist as quickly as possible. Thus, we implement the blacklist
3[bi : bj ] denotes a block of bits {bk}, i ≤ k ≤ j.
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with a small amount of L1 cache backed by permanent storage, e.g., main
memory. Because the blacklist write only happens at the bottom-level period
and the number of large flows detected in one iteration of the algorithm is
usually small, we first write these large flows in the L1 cache and move
them from L1 cache to permanent storage at a slower rate. By managing
the blacklist in this way, we provide high bandwidth for blacklist writing,
defending against attacks that overflow the blacklist.
No-FP guarantee. To guarantee no FP, we only identify large flows
whose counters have no second flow. At the bottom level Ld, we randomly
pick m flows from among the nd flows in Ld, and use Cuckoo hashing [51] to
assign each chosen flow to a counter. By using Cuckoo hashing, the expected
flow insertion time is constant and the worst-case lookup and update time
are constant. Furthermore, there are nearly no hash collisions.
To guarantee no FP, we only identify large flows whose counter has no
second flow, i.e. no flow hash collision Cfree. If we randomly hash flows into
counters at the bottom level Ld, the no-collision probability for a counter
is Pr(Cfree) = [
m−1
m
]nd−1, where nd is the number of flows selected into Ld.
Because we want to have d as small as possible, thus, we usually may choose
d = dlogm ne, where n is the total number of flows in the link. Thus, nd ≤ m
on average. Thus,
Pr(Cfree) =
[
m− 1
m
]mnd−1
m
≈ e−nd−1m (4.1)
When nd ≈ m, the no-collision probability Pr(Cfree) ≈ 1e = 0.368, which
gives a collision probability for each flow of 0.632.
To avoid the high collision probability in the regular hash above, we ran-
domly pick m flows (out of nd flows) instead. Each of m flows is monitored
by a dedicated counter (which does not introduce additional FNs, because
nd ≤ m). To efficiently implement this counter assignment, we can use
Cuckoo hashing [51] to achieve constant expected flow insertion time and
worst-case constant lookup and update time. Cuckoo hashing resolves colli-
sions by using two hash functions instead of only one in regular hashing. As
in [52], Mitzenmacher shows that, with three hash functions, Cuckoo hashing
can achieve expected constant insertion and lookup time with load factor of
91%. Thus, when m = nd, the Cuckoo hashing can achieve Pr(Cfree) ≈ 0.91,
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which is still much larger than Pr(Cfree) ≈ 0.368 in the regular hashing. As
nd is usually less than m (because we set d to be the ceiling of logm n), it is
reasonable to treat the Pr(Cfree) ≈ 1 in our later analysis. Cuckoo hashing
requires to store both the key (48 bits for IPv4, 144 bits for IPv6) and value
(32 bits) of an entry, thus, for each counter, we need space for the flow ID
and the counter value.
4.4.3 Shrinking Counter Entry Size
As we discussed, the number of flows hashed into the bottom level is much
less than m (e.g. at most 210). A key space of 96 bits (288 for IPv6) is
too large for less than 210 keys. We can hash the flow IDs into a smaller
key space, e.g. 48 bits to save memory size. For each flow, although hash
collision could happen and may result in FP in the detection in the bottom
level, the probability is less than 1− [248−1
248
]2
10−1 ≈ 2−38 which is very small.
For systems can tolerate such extremely low FP probability, we recommend
it to do so.
Using multiple RLFDs. If a link handles too much traffic to use a
single RLFD, we can use multiple RLFDs in parallel. Each flow is hashed
to a specific RLFD so that the load on each detector meets performance
requirements. The memory requirements scale linearly in the number of
RLFDs required to process the traffic.
4.4.4 RLFD Runtime Analysis
We analyze the runtime using the same CPU considered in EARDet [1].
An OC-768 (40 Gbps) high-speed link accommodates 40 million mid-size
(1000 bit) packets per second. To operate at the line rate, a modern 3.2 GHz
CPU must process each packet within 76 CPU cycles. A modern CPU might
contain 32 KB L1 cache, 256 KB L2 cache, and 20 MB L3 cache. It takes
4, 12, and 30 CPU cycles to access L1, L2, and L3 CPU cache, respectively;
accessing main memory is as slow as 300 cycles.
If, over a 40-Gbps link, we conservatively pick a large-flow threshold rate
γ = 100 kbps (a low-rate threshold in today’s networks), a maximum of
400, 000 flows can use the threshold rate. An RLFD with 400, 000 flows and
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128 counters per level only needs d = 3 levels to get an average of 24.4 flows
at the bottom level, causing only a few collisions for the 128 counters at the
bottom level which will be handled by the Cuckoo hashing approach. Even
if we consider a much larger number of flows, such as 40 million, d = 4 levels
results in around 19.1 flows at the bottom level. In such a four-level RLFD,
a flow’s path through the tree will require only 4 · log2 128 = 28 bits, so a
64-bit integer is large enough for the hash value. In practice, the threshold
rate may be higher than 100 kbps, and the number of flows is likely to be
under 40 million.
Computational complexity. Based on the implementation and opti-
mizations in Section 4.4.2, RLFD performs the following steps on each packet:
(1) a hash computation to find the flow’s path in the tree, (2) a bitwise AND
operation to find the subpath down to the depth of the current period, (3) an
integer comparison to determine if the flow is part of an active counter, and
(4) a counter value update if the flow is hashed into the loaded counter ar-
ray. Each of these operations is O(1) complexity and fast enough to compute
within 76 CPU cycles.
At the bottom level, after operations (1) to (3), RLFD performs the fol-
lowing steps: (5) a Cuckoo lookup/insert to find the appropriate counter,
(6) a counter value update to represent the usage of a flow, (7) a large-flow
check that compares the counter value with a threshold, and (8) an on-chip
blacklist write if the counter has exceeded the threshold. Steps (5)–(7) are
only performed on packets from the small fraction of flows that are loaded in
the bottom-level array; step (8) is only for packets of the flows identified as
large flows in step (7), and this only happens once for each flow (if we block
the large flows in the blacklist). Thus steps (5)–(8) are executed much less
frequently than steps (1)–(4). Even so, steps (5)–(8) have a constant time in
expectation, and are likely negligible in comparison with steps (1)–(4).
Storage complexity. RLFD only keeps a small array of counters and
a few additional variables: the hash function key, the 64-bit mask value for
the current level, and the 64-bit identifier of the currently loaded counter
array. Because we use Cuckoo hashing at the bottom level, besides a 32-bit
field for the counter value, each counter entry needs to have a field for the
associated flow ID key, which is 96 bits in IPv4 and 288 bits in IPv6. An
array of 128 counters requires 2 KB in IPv4 and 5 KB for IPv6, which readily
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fits within the L1 cache. As discussed in Section 4.4.3, we can further shrink
the flow ID field size to 48 bits (with FP probability ≤ 2−38 for each flow); if
deployed, a 128 counter array is 1.25 KB and a 1024 counter array is 10 KB
for both IPv4 and IPv6, quite a bit less than the size of the L1 cache (32
KB).
4.4.5 RLFD’s Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages. With recursive subdivision and other optimization tech-
niques, RLFD is able to (1) identify low-rate large flows with non-zero prob-
ability, with probability close to 100% for flows that cause extensive damage
(Section 4.5.3 analyzes RLFD’s detection probability); and (2) guarantee
no-FP, eliminating damage from FP.
Disadvantages. First, a landmark-window-based RLFD cannot guar-
antee exact detection over large-flow specification based on arbitrary time
windows [1].4 However, this approximation results in limited damage, as
mentioned in Section 4.3. Second, recursive subdivision based on landmark
time windows requires at least one detection cycle to catch a large flow. Thus,
RLFD cannot guarantee low damage for flows with very high rates. Third,
RLFD works most effectively when the large flow sends over the flow speci-
fication in all d levels, so bursty flows with a burst duration shorter than the
RLFD detection cycle Tc are likely to escape detection (where burst duration
refers to the amount of time during which the bursty flow sends in excess of
the flow specification).
4.4.6 CLEF Hybrid Scheme
We propose a hybrid scheme, CLEF (in-Core Limiting of Egregious Flows),
which is a parallel composition with one EARDet and two RLFDs (Twin-
RLFD). This hybrid can detect both high-rate and low-rate large flows with-
out producing FPs, requiring only a limited amount of memory. We do not
include flow memory in this hybrid scheme because its detection is not as
deterministic as EARDet’s.
4Landmark window and arbitrary window are introduced in Section 2.1
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Parallel composition of EARDet and RLFD. As described in Sec-
tion 4.3.2, we combine EARDet and RLFD in parallel so that RLFD can
help EARDet detect low-rate flat flows, and EARDet can help RLFD
quickly catch high-rate flat and bursty flows.
Twin-RLFD parallel composition. RLFD is most effective at catching
flows that violate flow specification across an entire detection cycle Tc. An
attacker can reduce the probability of being caught by RLFD by choosing a
burst duration shorter than Tc and a inter-burst duration greater than Tc/d
(thus reducing the probability that the attacker will advance to the next
round during its inter-burst period). We therefore introduce a second RLFD
(RLFD(2)) with a longer detection cycle T
(2)
c (denoting the first RLFD and
its detection cycle by RLFD(1) and T
(1)
c , respectively), so that a flow must
have burst duration shorter than T
(1)
c and burst period longer than T
(2)
c /d
to avoid detection by the Twin-RLFD. For a given average rate, flows that
evade Twin-RLFD have a higher burst rate than flows that evade a single
RLFD. By properly setting T
(1)
c and T
(2)
c , Twin-RLFD can synergize with
EARDet, ensuring that a flow undetectable by Twin-RLFD must use a
burst higher than EARDet’s rate threshold γh.
Timing randomization. An attacker can strategically send traffic with
burst durations shorter than T
(1)
c , but choose low duty cycles to avoid detec-
tion by both RLFD(1) and EARDet. Such an attacker can only be detected
by RLFD(2), but RLFD(2) has a longer detection delay, allowing the attacker
to maximize damage before being blacklisted. To prevent attackers from de-
terministically maximizing damage, we randomize the length of the detection
cycles T
(1)
c and T
(2)
c .
4.5 Analysis
In this section, we discuss RLFD’s performance and its large-flow detection
probability. We then compare CLEF with state-of-the-art schemes, consider-
ing various types of large flows under CLEF’s worst-case background traffic.
Due to limited space, some derivations are in Appendix B. The notations
used in the rest of sections in this chapter are introduced in Table 4.2.
Detection probability. Single-level detection probability is the probabil-
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Table 4.2: Table of Notations.
Generic notations:
ρ , Rate of (outbound) link capacity
γ, β , Rate and burst threshold flow specification
θ , Duty cycle of bursty flows (θ ≤ 1)
Tb , Period of burst
Ratk, α , Average large-flow rate, and Ratk = αγ
n , Number of legitimate flows
nγ , ργ ; Maximum number of legitimate flows at rate γ
m , Number of counters available in a detector
γh , ρm+1 ; EARDet high-rate threshold rate
Dfp , Damage caused by false accusation
Dover , Damage caused by overuse by large flows
E(Dover) , Expected overuse damage
RLFD notations:
d , Number of levels
n(k) , Number of legitimate flows in the level k
T` , Time period of a detection level
Tc , Detection cycle Tc = d · T`
T
(1)
c , Detection cycle Tc of the first RLFD in CLEF
T
(2)
c , Detection cycle Tc of the second RLFD in CLEF
Pr(Aα) , Detection prob. for flows with Ratk = αγ
α0.5 , When α ≥ α0.5, approximately Pr(Aα) ≥ 0.5
α1.0 , When α ≥ α1.0, approximately Pr(Aα) = 1.0
Timing-Randomized RLFD notations:
T`,min , The minimum T`
Tc,min , Tc,min = dT`,min
σ , σTc,min is the maximum Tc
P , Maximum period in brute-force search (for optimal attacks)
Win , The input size of reinforcement learning (for optimal attacks)
p , The punishment to reinforcement learner when the large flow
is caught
Pr(p) , The probability to apply the punishment p
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ity that a RLFD selects a correct counter (containing at least one large flow)
for the next level. Total detection probability is the probability that one copy
of RLFD catches a large flow in a cycle Tc (which can be estimated by the
product of single-level detection probabilities across all levels in a cycle).
4.5.1 RLFD Worst-Case Background Traffic
Since our goal is to minimize worst-case damage, here we discuss the worst-
case background traffic against RLFD. Given a large flow, we want to find
the legitimate flow traffic pattern that maximizes damage caused by the large
flow. We then assume this worst-case cross-traffic in the rest of the analysis.
Since damage increases with expected detection delay (and thus decreases
with single-level detection probability) in RLFD, we derive the worst-case
background traffic by finding the minimum single-level detection probability
for each level of RLFD. Theorem 7 states that the worst-case background
traffic consists of threshold-rate legitimate flows fully utilizing the outbound
link. The proof of Theorem 7 and further discussion are presented in Ap-
pendix B.1.3.
Theorem 7 On a link with a threshold rate γ and an outbound link capacity
ρ, given an attack large flow fatk, RLFD runs with the lowest probability to
select the counter containing fatk to the next level, when there are nγ = ρ/γ
legitimate flows, each of which is at the rate of γ.
Figure 4.5 presents single-level detection probabilities for several different
background traffic patterns, which empirically validates our theorem.
4.5.2 Characterizing Large Flows
To systematically compare CLEF with other detectors under various types
of attack flows, we categorize large flows based on three characteristics, as
Figure 4.6 illustrates:
1. Burst Period (Tb). A large flow sends a burst of traffic in a period of
Tb.
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Figure 4.5: RLFD’s single-level detection probability of the first level
against a large flow at different rate Ratk = αγ, when background legitimate
flows at various rates (0.01γ, 0.1γ, and γ) fully use the link capacity of
1000γ. The RLFD suffers the lowest detection probability when the
legitimate flows are at the threshold rate γ.
2. Duty Cycle (θ ∈ (0, 1]). In each period of length Tb, a large flow only
sends packets during a continuous time period of θTb and remains silent
during the rest of the period.
3. Average Rate (Ratk). This is the average volume of traffic sent from a
large flow per second over a time interval much longer than the burst
period Tb. The instant rate during the burst chunk θTb is Ratk/θ.
time
…
𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒌𝜽𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒌 𝜽𝑻𝒃 𝑻𝒃
Figure 4.6: Flow with average rate Ratk, burst period Tb, duty cycle
θ ∈ (0, 1].
By remaining silent between bursts, attacks such as the Shrew attack [49]
keep the average rate lower than the detection threshold to evade the detec-
tion algorithms based on landmark windows [2, 18–21,23,24,32].
A large flow may switch between different characteristic patterns over time,
including ones that comply with flow specifications. The total damage in this
case can be computed by adding up the damage inflicted by the large flow
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under each appearing pattern. Hence, for the purpose of the analysis, we
focus our discussion on large flows with fixed characteristic patterns.
4.5.3 RLFD Detection Probability for Flat Flows
We discuss the detection probability of RLFD over flat large flows in this
section. In order to detect a flat large flow, the traffic of the flat large flow
should be observable in each detection level.
The probability that RLFD catches one large flow in a detection cycle
increases with the number of large flows passing through RLFD. Because a
greater number of large flows implies that more counters may contain large
flows in each level, thus RLFD has a higher chance of correctly selecting
counters with large flows in the recursive subdivision. Hence, we discuss the
worst-case scenario for RLFD where only one large flow is present.
Because the operation in all but the bottom level of RLFD is similar and
the only difference is the flows hashed to the counter array, we discuss the
detection in a single level first and expand it to the whole detection cycle.
Additional numeric examples are provided in Appendix B.1.4.
Single-level detection probability. Given the total number of flows
traversing the link is n, we can predict the expected number of flows in the
kth level by n(k) = n/mk−1, where m is the number of counters. Since n(k)
depends only on the total number of flows and not the traffic distribution, we
discuss a single-level detection with n(k) legitimate flows, m counters, and a
large flow at the rate of Ratk = αγ, where γ is the threshold rate and α > 1.
When the context is clear, we use n to stand for n(k) in the discussion of
single-level detection.
According to Theorem 7, the worst-case background traffic is that all n
legitimate flows are at the threshold rate γ; Theorem 8 shows an approximate
lower bound of the single-level detection probability Pworst(m,n, α) in such
worst-case background traffic. The proof of Theorem 8 and its Corollaries 9
and 10 are presented in Appendix B.2.1.
Theorem 8 Given m counters in a level, n legitimate flows at full rate γ,
and a large flow fatk with an average rate of Ratk = αγ, the probability
Pworst(m,n, α) that RLFD will correctly select the counter with large flow
fatk has an approximate lower bound of 1 − Q(K, nm), where K =
⌊
n
m
+
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√
2 n
m
log n − α⌋; Q(K, n
m
) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the Poisson distribution Pois( n
m
).
Corollary 9 For a detection level with n legitimate flows, m counters, and
a large flow fatk at the average rate of α0.5 ·γ, the probability Pworst(m,n, α0.5)
that RLFD will correctly select the counter of fatk has an approximate lower
bound of 0.5, where α0.5 =
√
2 n
m
log n.
Corollary 10 For a detection level with n legitimate flows, m counters, and
a large flow fatk at the average rate of α1.0 ·γ, the probability Pworst(m,n, α1.0)
that RLFD will correctly select the counter of fatk has an approximate lower
bound of 1.0, where α1.0 = 2 · α0.5 = 2
√
2 n
m
log n.
Total detection probability. Theorem 11 describes the total probability
of detecting a large flow in one detection cycle. Detailed proof is provided in
Appendix B.2.2.
Theorem 11 When there are n legitimate flows and a flat large flow at the
rate of αγ, the total detection probability of a RLFD with m counters has an
approximate lower bound:
Pr(Aα) ≥

(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
1−Q(K, n
m
) , when n < nγ
(4.2)
where Kγ =
⌊nγ
m
+
√
2nγ
m
log nγ−α
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n−α⌋, and Q(x, λ)
is the CDF of the Poisson distribution Pois(λ).
4.5.4 Twin-RLFD Theoretical Overuse Damage
To evaluate RLFD’s performance, we derive a theoretical bound on the dam-
age caused by large flows against RLFD. Recall that there are two sources
of damage: FP damage Dfp and overuse damage Dover. Because RLFD has
no FP, there is no need to consider Dfp. Thus, we only theoretically analyze
Dover.
Theorem 12 shows the expected overuse damage for flat flows and bursty
flows against a Twin-RLFD. The proof is presented in Appendix B.2.3. Ad-
ditional numeric examples are in Appendix B.1.5.
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Theorem 12 A Twin-RLFD with RLFD(1) and RLFD(2) whose detection
cycles are T
(1)
c and T
(2)
c =
2dγh
αγ
T
(1)
c , respectively, it can detect bursty flows at
an average rate Ratk = αγ < θγh, where γh is the high-rate threshold rate of
the EARDet. The expected overuse damage caused by such flows has the
following upper bound:
E(Dover) ≤
T
(1)
c γα/θPr(Aα) , when θTb ≥ 2T (1)c
T (1)c 2dγh/θPr(Aα) , when θTb < 2T
(1)
c
(4.3)
where
Pr(Aα) ≥

(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
1−Q(K, n
m
) , when n < nγ
(4.4)
and Kγ =
⌊nγ
m
+
√
2nγ
m
log nγ − αθ
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n− αθ
⌋
(αθ = α/θ
when θTb ≥ 2T (1)c , and αθ = α when θTb < 2T (1)c ). The d is the number of
levels in RLFD, and Q(x, λ) is the CDF of the Poisson distribution Pois(λ).
The damage of flat flow is that in the case of θ = 1 and θTb ≥ 2T (1)c .
We can see that a properly configured Twin-RLFD can detect bursty flows
unable to be detected by EARDet (i.e., flows at average rate Ratk = αγ <
θγh).
4.5.5 Theoretical Comparison
We compare the CLEF hybrid scheme with the most relevant competitor,
the AMF-FM hybrid scheme [2], which runs an AMF and a FM sequen-
tially: all traffic is first sent to the AMF and the AMF sends detected large
flows (including FPs) to the FM to eliminate FPs. For completeness, we also
present the results of individual detectors, including Twin-RLFD, EARDet,
AMF, and Flow Memory (FM). Table 4.3 summarizes the damage inflicted
by different large-flow patterns when different detectors are deployed. The
damage is calculated according to the analyses of AMF (Appendix B.1.2),
FM (Appendix B.1.1), EARDet [1], and Twin-RLFD (Section 4.5.4). Fig-
ures B.2(c) and B.2(e) in Appendix B.1.5 provide more details about Twin-
RLFD’s overuse damage presented in Table 4.3.
Comparison setting. To compare detectors in an in-core router setting,
we allocate only 100 counters for each detector, and we allocate 50 counters
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for each RLFD in the Twin-RLFD for a fair comparison. Each hybrid scheme
has 200 counters in total to ensure fair comparison between hybrid schemes
is fair.
We consider both high-rate large flows (Ratk ≥ 250γ) and low-rate large
flows (Ratk < 250γ). 250γ is the minimum rate at which detection is guaran-
teed by EARDet, FM, and AMF-FM: θρ
m
= 0.25×10
5γ
100
. Low-rate large flows
are further divided into three rate intervals for thorough comparison. For
each rate interval, we consider the worst-case (θTb < 2Tc) and non-worst-
case (θTb ≥ 2Tc) burst length. The duty cycle of the bursty flow is set
to θ = 0.25, which is challenging for CLEF. Given an average rate Ratk, if
θ is close to 0 (close to 1), a bursty flow is easily detected by EARDet
(Twin-RLFD) in CLEF.
CLEF ensures lower damage. As shown in Table 4.3, Twin-RLFD and
CLEF outperform other detectors for identifying a wide range of low-rate
flows. However, due to limited memory, it remains challenging for Twin-
RLFD and CLEF to effectively detect large flows that are extremely close to
the threshold.
We can see that Twin-RLFD fails to limit the damage caused by high-
rate large flows, because the overuse damage is linear in Ratk of high-rate
flows (due to the minimum detection delay of one cycle). Thus, CLEF uses
EARDet to limit the damage caused by high-rate flows. CLEF is better
than the AMF-FM hybrid scheme. This is because the FP from AMF (with
limited memory) is too high to narrow down the traffic passed to the FM in
the downstream, so that the FM’s performance is not improved.
CLEF is memory-efficient. We now consider the minimum rate of
guaranteed detection (Rmin) for flat flows (i.e., flat large flows (θ = 1.0)
exceeding the rate Rmin) of these detectors. The Rmin of Twin-RLFD and
CLEF is bounded from above by 4θ
√
m lognγ
nγ
ρ
m
(derived from Corollary 10),
which is much less than the Rmin = θ
ρ
m+1
for EARDet and Rmin = θ
ρ
m
for
FM and AMF-FM. This is especially true when the memory is extremely
limited (i.e. nγ  m), where nγ is the maximum number of legitimate flows
at the threshold rate γ, and m is the number of counters for each individual
detector (each RLFD in Twin-RLFD has m/2 counters).
Figures 4.7(a) and 4.7(b) compare the Rmin among these three detectors
given two link capacities: (1) ρ = 105γ (i.e., nγ = 10
5), and (2) ρ = 107γ (i.e.,
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Figure 4.7: Minimum Rate of Guaranteed Detection Rmin (shown as Rmin/γ
in figures), for flat large flows (θ = 1.0), when link capacity ρ = 105γ and
107γ, where γ is threshold rate. Twin-RLFD and CLEF have much lower
rate of guaranteed detection than other schemes when the memory is
limited.
nγ = 10
7). The results suggest that Twin-RLFD and CLEF have a much
lower Rmin than that of other detectors when memory is limited, and the
Rmin is insensitive to memory size because RLFD can add levels to overcome
memory shortage.
For bursty flows, CLEF’sRmin is competitive to AMF-FM, due toEARDet.
4.6 Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate CLEF, RLFD, EARDet, and AMF-FM hybrid
scheme with respect to worst-case damage. We consider various large-flow
patterns and memory limits and assume background traffic that is challeng-
ing for CLEF and RLFD. The experiment results confirm that CLEF out-
performs other schemes, especially when memory is extremely limited.
4.6.1 Experiment Settings
Link settings. Since the required memory space of a large-flow detector
is linear to link capacity, we set the link capacity to ρ = 1 Gbps, which
is high enough to incorporate the realistic background traffic dataset while
ensuring the simulation can finish in reasonable time. We choose a very low
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threshold rate γ = 12.5 KB/s, so that the number of full-use legitimate flows
nγ = ρ/γ is 10000, ensuring that the link is as challenging as a backbone link
(as analyzed in Section 4.4.4). The flow specification is set to TH(t) = γt+β,
where β is set to 3028 bytes (which is as small as two maximum-sized packets,
making bursty flows easier to catch).
The results on this 1 Gbps link allow us to extrapolate detector perfor-
mance to high-capacity core routers, e.g., in a 100 Gbps link with γ = 1.25
MB/s. Because CLEF’s performance with a given number of counters is
mainly related to the ratio between link capacity and threshold rate nγ (as
discussed in Section 4.5.3), CLEF’s worst-case performance will scale lin-
early in link capacity when the number of counters and the ratio between
link capacity and threshold rate is held constant. AMF-FM, on the other
hand, performs worse as the number of flows increases (according to Ap-
pendix B.1.2 and B.1.1). Thus, with increasing link capacity, AMF-FM may
face an increased number of actual flows, resulting in worse performance.
In other words, AMF-FM’s worst-case damage may be superlinear in link
capacity. As a result, if CLEF outperforms AMF-FM in small links, CLEF
will outperform AMF-FM by at least as large a ratio in larger links.
Background traffic. We consider the worst background traffic for RLFD
and CLEF, using Theorem 7 to determine worst-case traffic. Aside from
attack traffic, the rest of the link capacity is completely filled with full-
use legitimate flows running at the threshold rate γ = 12.5 KB/s. The
total number of attack flows and full-use legitimate flows is nγ = 10000.
Once a flow has been blacklisted by the large-flow detectors, we fill the idle
bandwidth with a new full-use legitimate flow, to keep the link always running
with the worst-case background traffic.
Attack traffic. We evaluate each detector scheme against large flows with
various average rates Ratk and duty cycle θ. Their bursty period is set to be
Tb = 0.967 seconds. To evaluate RLFD and CLEF against their worst-case
busty flows (θTb < 2Tc), large flows are allotted a relatively small bursty
period Tb = 4T` = 0.967 seconds, where T` = β/γ = 0.242 seconds is the
period of each detection level in the single RLFD. In CLEF, RLFD(1) uses
the same detection level period T
(1)
` = T` = 0.242 seconds as well. Since
RLFD usually has d ≥ 3 levels and Tc ≥ 3T`, it is easy for attack flows to
meet θTb < 2Tc.
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In each experiment, we have 10 artificial large flows whose rate is in a range
of 12.5 KB/s to 12.5 MB/s (namely, 1 to 1000 times that of threshold rate
γ). The fewer large flows in the link, the longer delay required for RLFD and
CLEF to catch large flows; however, the easier it is for AMF-FM to detect
large flows, because there are less FPs from AMF and more frequent flow
eviction in FM. Thus, we use just 10 attack flows to challenge CLEF and the
results are generalizable.
Detector settings. We evaluate detectors with different numbers of coun-
ters (20 ≤ m ≤ 400) to understand their performance under different memory
limits. Although a few thousands of counters are available in a typical CPU,
not all can be used by one detector scheme. CLEF works reasonably well
with such a small number of counters and can perform better when more
counters are available.
• EARDet. We set the low-bandwidth threshold to be the flow specifi-
cation γt + β, and compute the corresponding high-rate threshold for
a given number of counters m as in [1]. The high-rate threshold rate is
γh =
ρ
m+1
.
• RLFD. A RLFD has d levels and m counters. We set the period of a
detection level as T` = β/γ = 0.242 seconds.
5 d = b1.2× logm(n)c+ 1
to have fewer flows than the counters at the bottom level. The counter
threshold of the bottom level is THRLFD = γT`+β = 2β = 6056 Bytes.
• CLEF. We allocate m/2 counters to EARDet, and m/4 counters
to each RLFD. RLFD(1) and EARDet are configured like the single
RLFD and the single EARDet above. For the RLFD(2), we properly
set its detection level period T
(2)
` to guarantee detection of most of
bursty flows with low damage. The details of the single RLFD and
CLEF are in Table B.1 (Appendix B.3).
• AMF-FM. We allocate m/2 counters to AMF and m/2 counters to
FM. AMF has four stages (a typical setting from [2]), each of which
contains m/8 counters. According to the flow specification γt + β, all
m counters are leaky buckets with a drain rate of γ and a bucket size
β.
5If T`  β/γ, it is hard for a large flow to reach the burst threshold β in such a short
time; if T`  β/γ, the detection delay is too long, resulting in excessive damage.
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We further test CLEF with different memory allocation ratio φ = mEARDet :
mTwin-RLFD, where mTwin-RLFD is the number of counters in Twin-RLFD
(each RLFD has mTwin-RLFD/2 counters) and mEARDet is the number of
counters in EARDet. In this test, we fix the total number of counters
m = mTwin-RLFD +mEARDet = 200.
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(a) Flat large flows, θ = 1.0
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(b) Bursty large flows, θ = 0.50
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(c) Bursty large flows, θ = 0.02
Figure 4.8: Damage (in Bytes) caused by 200-second large flows at different
average flow rate Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ under detection of
different schemes with different number of counters m. The larger the dark
area, the lower the damage guaranteed by a scheme. Areas with white color
are damage equals or exceeds 5× 108. CLEF outperforms other schemes in
detecting flat flows, and has competitive performance to AMF-FM and
EARDet over bursty flows.
4.6.2 Experiment Results
To configure each experiment (i.e., attack flow configurations and detector
settings), we did 50 repeated runs and present the averaged results.
Figures 4.8(a) to 4.8(c) demonstrate the damage caused by large flows at
different average rates, duty cycles, and number of detector counters during
200-second experiments; the lighter the color, the higher the damage. The
damage ≥ 5 × 108 Byte is represented by the color white. Figures 4.9(a)
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Figure 4.9: Damage (in Bytes) caused by 200-second large flows at different
average rate Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ. Each detection scheme uses
200 counters in total. The clear comparison among schemes suggests CLEF
outperforms others with low damage against various large flows.
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Figure 4.10: FN ratio in a 200-second detection for large flows at different
average rate Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ. Each detection scheme uses
200 counters in total. CLEF is able to detect (FN< 1.0) low-rate flows
undetectable (FN= 1.0) by AMF-FM or EARDet.
to 4.9(e) compare damage in cases of different detector schemes with 200
counters. Figures 4.10(a) to 4.10(e) show the percentage of FNs produced by
each detection scheme with 200 counters within 200 seconds. We cannot run
infinitely long experiments to show the +∞ damage produced by detectors
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like EARDet and AMF-FM over low-rate flows, so we use the FN ratio to
suggest it here. An FN of 1.0 means that the detector fails to identify any
large flow in 200 seconds and is likely to miss large flows in the future. Thus,
an infinite damage is assigned. On the contrary, if a detector has FN < 1.0,
it is able to detect remaining large flows at some point in the future.
CLEF ensures low damage against flat flows. Figures 4.8(a), 4.9(a),
and 4.10(a) support our theoretical analysis that RLFD and CLEF work ef-
fectively at detecting low-rate flat large flows and guaranteeing low damage.
On the contrary, such flows cause much higher damage against EARDet
and AMF-FM. The nearly black figure (in Figure 4.8(a)) for CLEF shows
that CLEF is effective for both high-rate and low-rate flat flows with differ-
ent memory limits. Figure 4.9(a) shows a clear damage comparison among
detector schemes. CLEF, EARDet, and AMF-FM all limit the damage to
nearly zero for high-rate flat flows. However, the damage limited by CLEF
is much lower than that limited by AMF-FM and EARDet for the low-rate
flat flows. EARDet and AMF-FM results show a sharp top boundary that
reflects the damage dropping to zero at the guaranteed-detection rates.
The damage limited by an individual RLFD is proportional to the large-
flow rate when the flow rate is high. Figure 4.10(a) suggests that AMF-
FM and EARDet are unable to catch most low-rate flat flows (Ratk < 10
6
Byte/sec), which explains the high damage by low-rate flat flows against
these two schemes. This supports our theoretical analysis of AMF-FM and
EARDet in Table 4.3: the infinite damage by low-rate flows against AMF-
FM and EARDet.
CLEF ensures low damage against various bursty flows. Fig-
ures 4.8(b) and 4.8(c) demonstrate the damage caused by bursty flows with
different duty cycle θ. The smaller the θ is, the burstier the flow. As the
large flows become burstier, the EARDet and AMF-FM schemes improve
at detecting flows whose average rate is low. Because the rate at the burst is
Ratk/θ, which increases as θ decreases, thus EARDet and AMF-FM are able
to detect these flows even though their average rates are low. For a single
RLFD, the burstier the flows are, the harder it becomes to detect the large
flows and limit the damage. As we discussed in Section 4.4.6, when the burst
duration θTb of flows is smaller than the RLFD detection cycle Tc, a single
RLFD has nearly zero probability of detecting such attack flows. Thus, we
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need Twin-RLFD in CLEF to detect bursty flows missed by EARDet in
CLEF, so that CLEF’s damage is still low as the figures show. When the
flow is very bursty (e.g., θ ≤ 0.1), the damage limitation of the CLEF scheme
is dominated by EARDet.
Figures 4.9(b) to 4.9(e) present a clear comparison among different schemes
against bursty flows. The damage limited by CLEF is lower than that limited
by AMF-FM and EARDet, when θ is not too small (e.g., θ ≥ 0.25). Even
though AMF-FM and EARDet have lower damage for very bursty flows
(e.g., θ ≤ 0.1) than the damage limited by CLEF, the results are close
because CLEF is assisted by an EARDet with m/2 counters. Thus, CLEF
guarantees a low damage limit for a wider range of large flows than the other
schemes.
CLEF outperforms others in terms of FN and FP. To make our
comparison more convincing, we examine schemes with classic metrics: FN
and FP. Since we know all four schemes have no FP, we simply check the
FN ratios in Figures 4.10(a) to 4.10(e). Generally, CLEF has a lower FN
ratio than do AMF-FM and EARDet. CLEF can detect large flows at a
much lower rate with a zero FN ratio, and is competitive with AMF-FM and
EARDet against very bursty flows (e.g., Figures 4.10(b) and 4.10(e)).
CLEF is memory-efficient. Figures 4.8(a) to 4.8(c) show that the dam-
age limited by RLFD is relatively insensitive to the number of counters. This
suggests that RLFD can work with limited memory and is scalable to larger
links without requiring large amounts of high-speed memory. This can be
explained by RLFD’s recursive subdivision, by which we simply add one
or more levels when the memory limit is low. Thus, we choose RLFD to
complement EARDet in CLEF.
In Figure 4.8(a), CLEF ensures low damage (shown in black) with tens of
counters, while AMF-FM suffers from high damage (shown in light colors),
even with 400 counters. This supports our theoretical results in Figures 4.7(a)
and 4.7(b).
CLEF is effective against various types of bursty flows. Fig-
ures 4.11(a) and 4.11(b) demonstrate the changes of damage and FN ratio
versus different duty cycles θ when CLEF is used to detect bursty flows.
In the 200-second evaluation, as θ decreases, the maximum damage across
different average flow rates increases first by (θ ≥ 0.1) and then decreases
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by (θ < 0.1). The damage increases when θ ≥ 0.1 because Twin-RLFD (in
CLEF) gradually loses its capability to detect bursty flows. The damage
therefore increases due to the increase in detection delay.
However, the maximum damage does not increase all the way as θ de-
creases, because when θ is getting smaller, EARDet is able to catch bursty
flows with a lower average rate. This explains the lower damage from large
flows in the 200-second timeframe. Figure 4.11(b) shows that the FN ratio
curve changes within a small range as θ decreases, which also indicates the
stable performance of CLEF against various bursty flows. Moreover, the FN
ratios are all below 1.0, which means that CLEF can eventually catch large
flows, whereas EARDet and AMF-FM cannot.
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Figure 4.11: Damage and FN ratio for large flows at different average rate
Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ under detection of CLEF with m = 200
counters. CLEF is not sensitive to bursty flows across duty cycles: (1) the
damages are around the same scale (not keep increasing as duty cycle
decrease, because of EARDet), and (2) the FN ratios are stable and
similar.
Tuning CLEF’s performance by changing memory allocation strat-
egy. Figures 4.12(a) to 4.12(e) compare damage caused by CLEFs with
different memory allocation strategies between EARDet and Twin-RLFD,
when we fix the total number of counters at 200. Figures 4.13(a) to 4.13(e)
show the percentage of FNs produced by CLEFs with different memory allo-
cation strategies. These figures demonstrate that the more counters allocated
to Twin-RLFD, the lower damage caused by flat flows; on the contrary, the
more counters allocated to EARDet, the lower damage caused by bursty
flows. Thus, we may dynamically change the memory allocation strategy so
that CLEF can detect both flat and bursty flows with strong performance.
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Figure 4.12: Damage (in Bytes) caused by 200-second large flows at
different average rate Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ. Each CLEF
scheme allocate 200 counters to EARDet and Twin-RLFD according to
the ratio φ = # of EARDet counters
# of Twin-RLFD counters
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Figure 4.13: FN ratio in a 200-second detection for large flows at different
average rate Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ. Each CLEF scheme
allocates 200 counters to EARDet and Twin-RLFD according to the ratio
φ = # of EARDet counters
# of Twin-RLFD counters
.
Moreover, such dynamical memory allocation may help prevent attackers
from gaining the maximum damage by choosing the worst-case attack traf-
fic.
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4.7 Timing-Randomized CLEF in Adversarial
Environment
In this section, we further discuss the performance of CLEF with timing-
randomized RLFD against adversarial attacks. In Section 4.4.6, we introduce
that the timing-randomized RLFD randomly chooses the detection cycle Tc,
so that it can prevent attackers from deterministically maximizing damage;
here, we explore how good CLEF can achieve to limit the damage caused by
an optimal attack.
4.7.1 Timing-Randomized RLFD
To randomize the detection cycle of a RLFD, we randomly pick up a detection
cycle Tc at the beginning of each detection cycle according to a probability
distribution Pr(Tc). For simplicity in the analysis, we set each detection level
period T` equally as Tc/d, where d is number of levels in one cycle.
By timing randomization, a single RLFD may act as a Twin-RLFD, be-
cause we can switch the detection cycle Tc of a single RLFD between the two
detection cycles of two RLFDs in Twin-RLFD (i.e. T
(1)
c and T
(2)
c ). Thus,
without of loss of generalizability, we only discuss the performance of a single
timing-randomized RLFD in this section.
Although switching Tc in a single RLFD between T
(1)
c and T
(2)
c can mimic
a Twin-RLFD, to prevent attackers from deterministically maximizing dam-
age, Tc should also be set as some values in [T
(1)
c , T
(2)
c ]. The minimum de-
tection cycle is T
(1)
c and the maximum detection cycle is T
(2)
c . To clearly
formulate the problem, we denote T
(1)
c = Tc,min, T
(2)
c = σTc,min, and the
minimum detection level period T`,min = Tc,min/d.
4.7.2 Adversary Model
We assume attackers know the probability distribution of the detection cycle,
but have no knowledge of secret seeds used to generate random variables. To
learn the upper bound damage caused by the optimal attack, we further as-
sume that the attacker can arbitrarily manipulate the timing of each packet
in the large flow. Thus, for each timing-randomized RLFD, an attacker can
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create an optimal attack against the detection cycle probability distribution.
These strong assumptions for attackers are very challenging to CLEF and
impractical for real attackers, thus the performance of CLEF against attack-
ers in the real world should be much better than the worst-case performance
in such an extreme case.
4.7.3 Optimal Attack Traffic Problem
The optimal attack traffic is the large flow that can cause the maximum
damage before it is detected by CLEF.
Since RLFD identifies large flows according to the total traffic amount
during a detection level, thus the detection level period T`,min of the minimum
detection cycle Tc,min is the time granularity to the attacker. The attacker
only consider how much traffic amount to send during each T`,min slot, but
there is no need to manipulate the traffic inside a time slot T`,min, because
it does not change the detection results of RLFD. To avoid the detection by
EARDet as much as possible, the attacker should always send flat traffic
during each time slot T`,min, because burstier traffic is easier for EARDet
to detect.
As shown in Section 4.5.3, the single-level detection probability for a large
flow is close to 1 for most of large flows, unless the large-flow rate is too close
to the threshold rate γ of the flow specification. Therefore, if a large flow
sends traffic during a time slot T`,min, the best strategy is to send traffic at
the rate close to EARDet’s high-rate threshold γh to maximize the damage
caused in this time slot T`,min, while not being detected by EARDet (because
it is below the γh). Because a successful RLFD detection requires that a
large flow sends traffic in all detection levels in one detection cycle, a large
flow can send traffic at rate close to γh in d − 1 levels and keep silent in
the one level left, so that the large flow can maximize the damage in one
detection cycle. However, due to the timing randomization applied in RLFD,
the attacker cannot deterministically learn its current state, such as which
detection level is in the current detection cycle and how long the detection
cycle and detection level are. At the best, the attacker can only learn a
probability distribution for the current state, and make decision for the next
time slot T`,min to maximize the expected damage caused by the large flow
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before being caught.
A large flow that aggressively sends traffic in all time slots will be caught
shortly; while a large flow that conservatively sends traffic may cause rel-
atively low damage. Thus a smart attacker should try to over-send traffic
above the threshold rate as much as possible while not being detected; if the
attacker cannot avoid being detected while over-sending traffic (when the
threshold rate is larger than the maximum large-flow rate at which the large
flow can be undetectable), it should try to maximize the over-sent traffic
during the lifetime of the large flow.
Brute-force search for the optimal attack. Figure 4.14 describes how
we formulate the problem of finding the optimal attack traffic into a brute-
force search problem. First, we divide the time axis into time slots of T`,min.
As we discussed above, in a time slot, an optimal large flow either sends
traffic at the rate close to γh or does not send any traffic. Thus, for each
time slot, there are two possible states: sending traffic (“1”), and sending no
traffic (“0”). For a chunk of large-flow traffic over N time slots, there are 2N
possible traffic patterns.
In our problem, it is unrealistic to traverse every traffic pattern, because
some traffic patterns may result in undetectable large flows, which have an
infinite lifetime. Thus, we have to assume that the traffic patterns are in
periods, traffic pattern repeats in each period. Unfortunately we have to set
the maximum period size P in the brute-force search, otherwise, the problem
is unsolvable. We will search for traffic pattern for each period less than or
equal to P , and find the traffic pattern that causes the most damage as the
optimal traffic pattern. Although theoretically, the solution of this problem
is not strictly proved as an optimal problem, it can still help us understand
CLEF’s performance against adversarial environments.
The value P is limited by the computation resource. If we set P as a
very large value, the brute force is hard to terminate shortly with limited
computation power. Intuitively, we set P as a value around T
(2)
c /T`,min = σd,
because the attack traffic that can avoid detection should have the similar
periodic behavior as that of the detection cycles, therefore setting P as the
number of time slots in a maximum detection cycle T
(2)
c is a good guess.
There are at least 2P traffic patterns, and it is still hard to use a brute-
force search for a real example of links requiring high σ (e.g. ≥ 1000). Thus,
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we further propose an efficient approximation by reinforcement learning [53]
with neural networks [54].
𝒕𝜸𝒉 …
𝑻𝒍,𝒎𝒊𝒏
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
Figure 4.14: Brute-force search for the optimal attack.
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RL Input Action To Predict
Figure 4.15: Reinforcement learning (RL) for the optimal attack.
Reinforcement learning for the optimal attack. We formulate the
problem of finding the optimal attack as a reinforcement learning problem,
in which the learner decides whether it should send traffic (at the rate close
to γh) in the incoming time slot (i.e. decide to take action “0” or “1”) based
on the states of the most recent Win = T
(2)
c /T`,min = σd time slots in the
past (as in Figure 4.15). Thus, we take the states of Win time slots as the
input vector of the reinforcement learner, and the output is a probability of
sending traffic in the incoming time slot (i.e. taking action “1”). Although
it is best to take all history states in the past as input, it is infeasible to feed
such length-unfixed and very long input vectors to a neural network. Thus,
we truncate the history states and only use the most recent Win time slots,
because Win = σd must include all time slots in the most recent detection
cycle, which is intuitively the most relevant information for the attacker to
deduce how long the current cycle is and which level it is currently in.
Neural network for reinforcement learning. We currently use a fully
connected neural network with three hidden layers, each of which has 2Win
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Figure 4.16: Reinforcement learning neural network (a fully connected
network).
hidden nodes. The input layer has Win nodes, which are the 0/1 states of the
last Win time slots; the output layer only has one node, which is the prob-
ability (from 0 to 1) of sending traffic in the next time slot. The activation
function of hidden nodes is ReLU [55] for the fast model converging, and the
activation function of the output node is Sigmoid function [56] limiting the
output value from 0 to 1.
Because our target to maximize is the damage caused by the large flow
after the action made by the output of the neural network, the reward of
each action At at the time slot t is rt = 1 when we send traffic, and rt = 0
when we send nothing. For a input vector [St−Win , ..., St−2, St−1], the target
to maximize is
∑
i≥t λ
i−tri, where Si denotes the state value of time slot
i. The reward discount λ = 0.99 is a typical value used in reinforcement
learning.
However, such an experiment with finite steps cannot represent a good
attack in infinitely long experiments, because the attackers are more aggres-
sive to take the risk of being detected when it is closer to the end of a finite
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experiment, while a good attack in the infinite experiment may not always
be detected so that it can cause more damage in the future.
Thus, we modify the optimization target above in two folds. First, we add
additional p punishment to the learner, if the large flow is caught. Second,
for an action, we only consider the reward itself (i.e. at time slot t) and
rewards of the next σd − 1 steps in the future, because this action cannot
make the large flow detected after σd time slots, which is out of the range of
the largest detection cycle T
(2)
c . Therefore the target(At) (for action at time
slot t) to maximize for an input vector [St−Win , ..., St−2, St−1] is as follows:
target(At) = −p+
t+σd−1∑
i=t
λi−tri (4.5)
We set p = σd, so that being detected is the worst case to an action, and
the attacker will try to maximize the damage in the future σd steps, while
avoiding the detection.
We further introduce a punishment probability Pr(p) to specify how ag-
gressive the trained attacker we want to reach. When Pr(p) = 1, we always
apply the punishment p when the large flow is detected, and the trained at-
tacker is the least aggressive; when P (p) = 0, we never apply the punishment
p, and the trained attacker is the most aggressive. By tuning the Pr(p) from
0 to 1, we can continuously change the aggressiveness of the trained attacker,
so that we can explore the attack space. In some cases with a high threshold
rate, conservative attackers may send traffic at rates even below the thresh-
old rate and do not cause damage at all, while an aggressive attacker may
cause more damage (even though it may be detected sooner). Therefore, it
is necessary for us to explore the attack space by changing the aggressiveness
of the attackers, and find the optimal attack that causes the most damage.
Because the neural network does gradient decent to converge the solution
to the optimal one, it can avoid the brute-force computation complexity
which increases exponentially by the maximum period P = σd.
4.7.4 Experiment Settings
Experiment context. In preliminary experiments, we test our rein-
forcement learning method in a small-scale example with d = 4 levels and
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σ = T
(2)
c /T
(1)
c = 10 (therefore punishment p = 40), and compare the rein-
forcement learning results with the ones from brute-force search with maxi-
mum period P = 24 (due to limited computation resource). The goal is to
testify that the reinforcement learning results is a good approximation for
the one from brute-force search.
At the beginning of each detection cycle, the RLFD randomly pick up Tc
from [1, 10]×T (1)c according to the probability distribution Pr(Tc = i×T (1)c ) =
1/i∑j=10
j=1 1/j
, where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 10. Thus, RLFD can run detection cycles with
different Tc with equal duty time in average.
Reinforcement learning setting. The batch size is 10 episodes, which
means we update our network model parameters every 10 episodes. The
beginning of a episode is when we reset the RLFD and pass a new large flow
through the RLFD; the end of an episode is either when the large flow is
caught by the RLFD, or the number of time slots that has been run reaches
our maximum number which is set as 1000 in our experiment.
Every 1000 episodes for training, we test the model by running it for 100
episodes and average the damage caused by the large flow, so that we can
learn whether the model converges at some point in the training procedure.
Neural network setting. The neural network has 40 input nodes and
80 hidden nodes in each hidden layer. We use the Adam optimizer [57] with
learning rate of 0.001.
4.7.5 Experiment Results
Figures 4.17(a) and 4.17(b) present the damages caused by large flows pro-
duced by reinforcement learning and brute-force search, when the threshold
rate is 0.167 times the EARDet high-rate threshold.
Reinforcement learning can converge to optimal attacks. Fig-
ure 4.17(a) shows the damage caused by large flows at different average
rates. First, the damage caused by flows from brute-force search shows the
maximum damage that a large flow at a specific rate can achieve.6 As we
expected, the most aggressive attacker sends the traffic at the rate of the
EARDet high-rate threshold γh can only cause a relatively low damage
6With the assumption that the maximum period of the traffic pattern is P = 24.
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Figure 4.17: Damage caused by large flows produced by reinforcement
learning (RL) and brute-force search (BF), when the threshold rate is
γ = 0.167× γh. The γh is the high-rate threshold of EARDet in CLEF.
(less than 20γhT`,min) in this case, because such large flows are caught in a
short time. However, a large flow at a rate of 0.29γh can produce damage as
high as 85γhT`,min, because it stays hard to detect while sending traffic at a
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non-trivial rate.
Then, the damages caused by large flows produced by reinforcement learn-
ing are gradually close to the brute-force-search damages as the the number
of episodes increases. The reinforcement-learning damage is even higher than
the brute-force-search damage at some points, for example, the damage at
the rate of 0.29×γh. A reasonable explanation is that our brute-force search
assumes the maximum period of the traffic pattern is P = 24; however, the
reinforcement learning results do not have such an assumption, and may find
attacks even better than the brute-force-search attacks.
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Figure 4.18: Lifetime of large flows at different rates.
Reinforcement learning is computational efficient. Figure 4.17(b)
demonstrates the maximum damage caused by all large flows at various rates
at each episode of the reinforcement learning. We can see the maximum dam-
age is approaching the maximum brute-force-search damage as the number
of episodes increases, which suggests that our model is converging to the
optimal attack. This process only needs around 100 × 3 × 104 = 3 × 106
episodes (we try 100 different punishment probability Pr(p), and each trial
takes 3 × 104 episodes to converge), while brute-force search requires more
than 224×100 = 1.68×109 episodes (because we need to calculate an average
damage across 100 repeated episodes for each traffic pattern out of at least
224). This supports that the reinforcement learning is much more efficient
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Figure 4.19: Damage caused by large flows produced by reinforcement
learning (RL) and brute-force search (BF), when the threshold rate is
γ = 0.3× γh. The γh is the high-rate threshold of EARDet in CLEF.
than brute-force learning in this task. The computation requirement gap
between the reinforcement learning and the brute-force search is much larger
in the large-scale examples in the real core routers.
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RLFD’s guarantee in large-flow detection. Figure 4.18 presents the
lifetime of large flows at different rates. The large flows are produced by both
brute-force search and reinforcement learning at the final episode. It shows
that the large flows with high damage in Figure 4.17(a) have a long lifetime,
and some of them are not detected at all (i.e. lifetime is the maximum time
limit 1000T`,min in our experiments). That means RLFD in this setting can
guarantee detection for large flows at rates higher than 0.25γh. In a large-
scale example with T
(2)
c /T
(1)
c = σ > 100, RLFD may guarantee detection of
large flows at lower rates, but with a higher damage (because the average Tc
is longer).
Figures 4.19(a) and 4.19(b) show the results in a different threshold rate
γ = 0.3 × γh. With higher threshold rate, RLFD can guarantee a lower
damage limit, because large flows at rates higher than this threshold rate are
hard to escape from the detection.
4.7.6 Future Work
The experiment results in the small-scale example suggest the efficiency and
effectiveness of using reinforcement learning to find optimal attack patterns.
In the future, we should try a more efficient reinforcement learning model and
test it on a large-scale example which is closer to the practice. For example,
a one-dimensional convolutional neural network (CNN) [58] would be a good
try for large-scale examples. The CNN comes with fewer parameters than a
fully connected network for the same input and output scale, thus the model
is easier to converge and uses less computation power to train.
4.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes two new large-flow detection algorithms. First, we de-
velop a randomized Recursive Large-Flow Detection (RLFD) scheme, which
uses very little memory yet provides eventual detection of persistently large
flows. Second, we develop CLEF, which scales to Internet core routers and is
resilient against worst-case traffic. None of the prior approaches can achieve
the same level of resilience with the same memory limitations. To compare
attack resilience among various detectors, we propose a damage metric that
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summarizes the impact of attack traffic on legitimate traffic. CLEF can con-
fine damage even when faced with the worst-case background traffic because
it combines a deterministic EARDet for the rapid detection of very large
flows and two RLFDs to detect smaller large flows. We proved that CLEF
is able to guarantee low-damage large-flow detection against various attack
flows with extremely limited memory, outperforming other schemes even with
CLEF’s worst-case background traffic. Further experimental evaluation con-
firms the findings of our theoretical analysis and shows that CLEF has the
lowest worst-case damage among all detectors and consistently low damage
over a wide range of attack flows. We believe that CLEF makes deployment
of large-flow detection finally practical even for core routers.
We further explore CLEF’s performance when we randomize its timing
in RLFD. We propose a reinforcement-learning-based method to find opti-
mal attacks to such timing-randomized CLEF, and the preliminary experi-
ment results show our method is much more computational efficient than a
brute-force search. The results demonstrate the timing-randomized CLEF
guarantees a good detection performance in such adversarial environments.
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CHAPTER 5
DISSERTATION SUMMARY
Many malicious behaviors threatening service providers are anomalies differ-
ent from legitimate operations. In this dissertation, we focus on mitigating
the damage caused by large Internet flows, which are collections of related
traffic consuming more than the resource allocated to them. This disser-
tation reviews some basic knowledge and typical existing approaches in the
large-flow detection problem, and identifies the shortcomings of current work.
First, we propose EARDet, a novel arbitrary-window-based algorithm,
which is exact outside an ambiguity window. EARDet not only inherits
the property of no false negative over a high-bandwidth threshold (from
MG algorithm), but also has no false positive on small flows complying a
low-bandwidth threshold. EARDet guarantees deterministic detection that
does not make any assumption on the input traffic or attack traffic pattern.
Our theoretical and experimental evaluation demonstrate these properties in
EARDet, and show it outperform existing algorithms in detecting both flat
flows and bursty flows.
Although EARDet guarantees exact detection over large flows above
high-bandwidth with limited memory, the detection for large flows falling
in the ambiguity region is still not guaranteed. Then, we propose a random-
ized Recursive Large-Flow Detection (RLFD) scheme, which uses very little
memory yet provides eventual detection of persistently large flows in the
ambiguity region of EARDet. Unlike existing detectors, RLFD efficiently
distinguishes large flows from legitimate flows by evaluating one set of flows
at a time, and recursively shrinking the set of suspected large flows. Be-
cause of the pigeonhole principle, RLFD cannot guarantee immediate exact
detection with limited memory. Thus, larger flows are detected with higher
probability in RLFD, so the expected detection time decreases in the level
of overuse, resulting in limited damage across a wide range of flow overuse
amounts.
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Furthermore, we develop, CLEF, a hybrid scheme that combines EARDet
and RLFD in parallel, which is super memory-efficient and able to scale to
Internet core routers. CLEF is resilient against worst-case traffic, while none
of the existing approaches can achieve same level of resilience with the same
memory limitations. To compare attack resilience among various detectors,
we propose a damage metric that summarizes the impact of attack traffic
on legitimate traffic. With a deterministic EARDet, CLEF can guarantee
the rapid detection of very large flows; with two RLFDs, CLEF can guar-
antee detection of smaller large flows that are in the ambiguity region of
EARDet. Our theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation both sup-
port that CLEF has the lowest worst-case damage among all detectors and
consistently low damage over a wide range of attack flows.
Future work. There is some future work for CLEF and its components
(RLFD and EARDet). (1) CLEF is quite simple and easy to apply in in-
dustry, therefore, we want to build a real system with the CLEF algorithm
and test it in the real network to see the performance in practice. (2) In the
experiment, EARDet’s detection probability curves under different input
traffic (congested and non-congested traffic) are highly matched, even in the
ambiguity region. Thus, it should be interesting to research the performance
in the ambiguity region in future research. (3) For RLFD with random-
ized timing, we preliminarily use reinforcement learning to explore RLFD’s
resilience against adversarial environments, and the results in small-scale
examples show that RLFD can guarantee detection and the limit damage
caused by adversarial attack traffics. In the future, we should further test
the timing-randomized RLFD in a realistic and large-scale example, which
may require more sophisticated neural network models.
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APPENDIX A
EXACT-OUTSIDE-AMBIGUITY-REGION
DETECTOR
A.1 Proof Sketches for Lemmas
Note that Appendices A.1.1 and A.1.4 are presented in the technical report
by Wu et al. [48].
A.1.1 Lemma 13 and Proof Sketch
Lemma 13 In any time interval [t1, t2], we assume there are k attack flows
occupy k counters from the beginning time t1 to the ending time t2. If all
the normal counters (counters except the ones occupied by attack flows) are
empty at beginning time t1 and ending time t2, then, the decrement of all the
counters is
(t2−t1)−tlrg
n+1−k ρ, where tlrg is the sum of time that k attack flows are
sending packets.
Proof sketch: In [t1, t2], because the attack flows occupied the link for
tlrg, the time length of t2−t1−tlrg is occupied by some real flows F or virtual
flows (there is no assumption for the flows in F , but such flows should fulfill
that normal counters are empty at beginning time t1 and ending time t2). In
the time of t2 − t1 − tlrg, sometimes the counters are increased by flows in
F , and sometimes the counters are decreased by flows in F or virtual flows.
Therefore, we can assume that the sum of all the decrement dec consists of
many small decrements deci, which happen in time interval ti,dec, and the
number of counters occupied by flows in F is xi during ti,dec. Because the
normal counters are empty at the beginning and the ending, when there is a
decrement deci for each counter, then there must be xi increment inci that
happened on xi non-empty normal counters. Therefore all the decrements
deci in these normal counters have a counterpart of xi increment inci, which
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takes ti,inc time length. Maybe deci and xi values of inci are not neighbors in
time domain, but for a decrement deci there must be xi values of inci, such
that
inci = deci (A.1)
In ti,dec, according to the three ways of decreasing and increasing the counter,
when the number of empty counters is l = n− k − xi, the deci and inci are
as follows:
deci =
ρ
n+ 1− k − xi · ti,dec (A.2)
inci = ρ · ti,inc (A.3)
Then, according to (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3)
⇒

ti,dec =
(n+ 1− k − xi) · deci
ρ
ti,inc =
inci
ρ
=
deci
ρ
(A.4)
At any time point in t2− t1− tlrg, counters either increase or decrease, thus
t2 − t1 − tlrg =
∑
i
(xi · ti,inc + ti,dec) (A.5)
Then, according to (A.4) and (A.5), we can get
t2 − t1 − tlrg =
∑
i
(xi · deci
ρ
+
(n+ 1− k − xi) · deci
ρ
) (A.6)
=
∑
i
(n+ 1− k) · deci
ρ
(A.7)
=
dec(n+ 1− k)
ρ
(A.8)
Then,
⇒ dec = (t2 − t1)− tlrg
n+ 1− k ρ (A.9)
Therefore, during [t1, t2] the decrement of all the counters is
(t2−t1)−tlrg
n+1−k ρ, and
this lemma is proved. 
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A.1.2 Lemma 14 and Proof Sketch
Lemma 14 In any time interval [t1, t2], if all the counters are empty at
the beginning time t1 and the ending time t2, then, the decrement of all the
counters is ρ
n+1
· (t2 − t1).
Proof sketch: Considering the scenario of Lemma 13 , when all the
counters are normal counters (namely k = 0), there is no assumption on all
the incoming flows except the condition that all the counters are empty at
the beginning time t1 and the ending time t2. This scenario is exactly the
same to what is described in Lemma 14. Therefore, to prove Lemma 14,
we just need to consider the scenario of k = 0 in Lemma 13. According to
Lemma 13, when k = 0, the tlrg must be 0, and therefore the decrement is
dec =
(t2 − t1)− tlrg
n+ 1− k ρ =
(t2 − t1)
n+ 1
ρ (A.10)
Thus, the decrement of the scenario described in Lemma 14 is ρ
n+1
· (t2− t1),
and this lemma is proved. 
A.1.3 Proof Sketch of Lemma 2
Proof sketch: To get the upper bound of decrement of all the counters,
we just need consider the maximum decrement for a counter in time interval
[t1, t2]. According to Lemma 14, we can know the decrement of each counter
is ρ
n+1
· (t2 − t1) when all the counters are empty at the beginning time
t1 and the ending time t2. However, intuitively, the greater the values of
counters are at the beginning, the greater the decrement is, because each
counter saves some time to increase these counters and they have more time
to decrease; also, the less the values of counters are at the ending, the more
the total decrement of all counters is, because if there are remaining values
in the counters, the counters must waste some time to increase the counters
instead of decrease them. Because the maximum value of a counter is α+βTH
and the minimum value of a counter is 0, the scenario of maximum decrement
is: (1) all the counters’ value are α+βTH at the beginning time t1 and (2) all
the counters are empty at the ending time t2. Denote the scenario described
in Lemma 14 and Lemma 2 as CASE1 and CASE2. The difference between
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CASE1 and CASE2 is that counters in CASE2 have a value of α+βTH at the
beginning, therefore there is an extra decrement of α + βTH in CASE2. To
have the extra decrement in CASE2, counters need to take some extra ti,dec
to decrease the extra decrement, and then the decrement of CASE2 except
the extra decrement α + βTH is lower than the
ρ
n+1
· (t2 − t1), which is the
decrement of CASE1. Therefore, the total decrement of CASE2 is lower than
ρ
n+1
· (t2 − t1) + α + βTH , namely:
dec <
ρ
n+ 1
· (t2 − t1) + α + βTH (A.11)
Therefore, this lemma is proved. 
A.1.4 Proof Sketch of Lemma 4
Proof sketch: WLOG, we assume flow f is associated with a counter at
t1 = 0, and in [0, tocp], flow f always occupies this counter. Then, intuitively,
in [0, tocp], the case to have minimum decrement decmin on this counter is
that: (1) at time 0 all the counters are empty; and (2) at time tocp, except
the counter of flow f , all other counters have the maximum value α + βTH .
Because the remaining values in the counter will cost extra time tinc for in-
creasing these counters, then according to Lemma 13, the t2−t1 in Lemma 13
is smaller and the decrement is smaller. Therefore, in the case mentioned
above, the decrement is minimized. According to Lemma 13, in this case
t2 − t1 = tocp − tinc, k = 1, then the minimum decrement is
decmin =
tocp − tinc − tlrg
n
ρ (A.12)
where tinc =
(n−1)(βTH+α)
ρ
.
Since f complies with TH`(t), tlrg < γ`/ρ · tocp + β`ρ .
⇒ decmin > tocp(1− γ`/ρ)
n
ρ− (βTH + α)(n− 1) + β`
n
(A.13)
⇔ decmin > γ` tocp +
tocp(1− (n+ 1)γ`ρ )
n
ρ− (βTH + α)(n− 1) + β`
n
(A.14)
When tocp > tβ` =
(n−1)α+(n+1)β`
[1−(n+1)γ`/ρ]ρ ,
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⇒ decmin > γ` tocp + (n− 1)α+ (n+ 1)β`
n
ρ− (βTH + α)(n− 1) + β`
n
(A.15)
⇒ γ` tocp + β` − decmin < βTH (A.16)
Because flow f complies with TH`(t), its counter value is smaller than
tocp + β` − decmin. Therefore, the counter is smaller than βTH after tβ` . 
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APPENDIX B
IN-CORE LIMITING OF EGREGIOUS
FLOWS
B.1 Additional Analysis
B.1.1 Flow Memory Analysis
We analyze the Flow Memory (FM) with random flow eviction mechanism,
which is applied with multistage filters in [2]. For each incoming packet
whose flow is not tracked, such FM randomly picks a flow from the tracked
flows and the new flow to evict. Thus, for each packet of the flow not tracked,
the existing tracked flow has a probability Pe =
1
m+1
to be evicted, where m
is the number of counters in the FM.
Theorem 15 In a link with total traffic rate of R (≤ ρ), the packet size
of Spkt, and the large-flow threshold TH(t) = γt + β, a flow memory with m
counters is able to detect large flows at rate around or higher than β
Spkt
R
m
with
high probability.
Proof sketch: We assume number of packets arriving at the FM per
second is at the packet rate of Rpkt, thus the time gap between two incoming
packets is Tpkt =
1
Rpkt
=
Spkt
R
. For a newly tracked flow f at timestamp 0, the
kth eviction happens at k · Tpkt, and Pe = 1m+1 is the probability that flow f
is evicted at the kth eviction. Evictions are not triggered by packets of flows
being tracked, however the number of flows untracked is far larger than the
number of flows being tracked, thus we can approximate treat the time gap
between evictions as Tpkt. Thus, the expected time length for the flow f to
be tracked is
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E(Ttrack) =
+∞∑
k=1
Pe(1− Pe)k−1kTpkt
= lim
k→+∞
(1− Pe)
(
1− (1− Pe)k
Pe
− (k + 1)(1− Pe)k
)
Tpkt
=
1− Pe
Pe
Tpkt = m · Tpkt
(B.1)
As the FM uses leaky bucket counters to enforce the large-flow threshold
TH
t
= γt + β (defined in Section 2.1), the counter threshold is the burst
threshold β. Thus, to detect a large flow at traffic rate of Ratk, the FM
requires the large flow being tracked at least for a time of β/Ratk, otherwise
the counter value cannot reach the threshold. Therefore,
Ratk >
β
E(Ttrack)
=
β
m · Tpkt =
β
Spkt
R
m
(B.2)
Thus for the large flows at rates far smaller than the β
Spkt
ρ
m
are likely to be
evicted before violating the threshold β.
In the practice, the packet size is not fixed, but we treat it with fixed
size for analyzing the least Ratk changes along with the m. Because the real
packet size is also limited in 1514 Bytes, the β
Spkt
is a bounded factor. As the
β is usually larger than the maximum packet size, the β
Spkt
> 1 for sure.
We can see the scale of the large flow rate can be detected by FM is similar
to that can be detected by EARDet (i.e., ρ
m+1
, where ρ is the link capacity).
They both increase as 1
m
increases. In the worst case of the FM, when the
traffic rate is at link capacity (R = ρ), the least detectable average rates Ratk
of the FM and the EARDet are at the same scale. One difference between
them is that the EARDet can guarantee deterministic detection, while the
Flow Memory detects flows probabilistically. Our simulations in Section 4.6
support the analysis above.
B.1.2 Multistage Filter Analysis
According to the theoretical analysis in [2], an m-counter multistage filter
with d stages each of which has m/d counters, the probability for a flow
hashed into a counter in each stage without collision (Cfree) to other flows is
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as follows. We let m′ = m/d, and assume there are n flows in total, then
Pr(Cfree) = 1− (1− (1− 1
m′
)n−1)d
= 1− (1− (1− 1
m′
)m
′ n−1
m′ )d
≈ 1− (1− e−n−1m′ )d
→ 0, when n→ +∞
(B.3)
where we assume the m′  1 and n/m′  1. The assumptions are reason-
able: (1) the number of counters m is usually around hundreds, and the d
is typically chosen as 4 in [2], therefore m′  1; and (2) we aim to use very
limited counters to detect large flows from a large number of legitimate flows,
thus n/m′  1.
In the case that every legitimate flow is higher than the half of the threshold
rate γ/2, the false positive rate is almost 100%, because the Pr(Cfree) is close
to 100%. Any collision in a counter results in that the counter value violates
the counter threshold and thus a falsely positive on legitimate flows.
B.1.3 RLFD Worst-Case Background Traffic
General case: Weighted balls-into-bins problem. In the well-known
balls-into-bins problem, we have m bins and n balls. For each ball, we ran-
domly throw it into one of m bins.
We treat the flows in the network as the balls, and the counter array as
the bins. Hashing flows into counters is just like randomly throwing balls
into bins, where each flow is a weighted ball with weight of its traffic volume
sent during a period T` of each level Lk (1 ≤ k ≤ d).
Worst case: Single-weight balls-into-bins problem. We assume the
rate threshold γ of our flow specification, TH(t) = γt + β, is γ = ρ
N
, where
the ρ is the outbound link capacity. In the general case, the legitimate flows
are at average rates less than or equal to the threshold rate γ, however we
show that the worst-case background traffic for RLFD to detecting a large
flow is that all legitimate flows are sending traffic at the rate of the threshold
rate γ (Theorem 7). As the inbound link capacity can be larger than the
outbound one, there still could be attack flows in this case. We prove the
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Theorem 7 by the Theorem 16 from Berenbrink et al. [59] which is for
weighted balls-into-bins games.
Theorem 16 Berenbrink et al. Theorem 3.1 For two weighted balls-
into-bins games B(w, n,m) and B′(w′, n,m) of n balls and m bins, the vectors
w = (w1, ..., wn) and w
′ = (w′1, ..., w
′
n) represent the weight of each ball in two
B and B′, respectively. If W =
∑n
i=1 wi =
∑n
i=1 w
′
i and
∑k
i=1wi ≥
∑k
i=1w
′
i
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, then E[Si(w)] ≥ E[Si(w′)] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where the
Si(w) is the total load of the i highest bins, and the E(Si(w)) is the expected
Si(w) across all m
n possible balls-into-bins combinations.
Lemma 17 and proof sketch.
Lemma 17 The RLFD has the lowest probability to select the right counter
of a large flow fatk to the next level, when the legitimate flows use up all
legitimate bandwidth.
We assume C1 and C2 are two different counter states after adding the
attack traffic and the traffic of some legitimate flows, and there are V more
volume of traffic allowed to send by the other legitimate flows before the
total volume of legitimate flows reaches the outbound link capacity. Let Vatk
be the value of the counter assigned to fatk, and the Vmax be the maximum
value of other counters. In the C1, we let Vatk > Vmax + V ; in the C2, we let
Vatk ≤ Vmax +V . Hence, C1 and C2 cover all possible counter states. As there
are still up to V volume of legitimate flows can be added into counters. We
use V ′atk and V
′
max to represent the final value of Vatk and Vmax. Thus, the
probability to select the counter of fatk is
Pr(V ′atk > V
′
max) = Pr(V
′
atk > V
′
max|C1)Pr(C1) + Pr(V ′atk > V ′max|C2)Pr(C2) (B.4)
Because Vatk > Vmax + V in C1, and the V ′max cannot exceed Vmax + V , thus
always V ′atk > V
′
max. Then,
Pr(V ′atk > V
′
max) = Pr(C1) + Pr(V ′atk > V ′max|C2)Pr(C2) (B.5)
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Let x be the amount of legitimate traffic added into counters after C2, where
0 ≤ x ≤ V . If the x = V , then there is a chance to have all V added on the
Vmax, and thus V
′
max = Vmax + V = Vatk = V
′
atk, so that Pr(V
′
atk > V
′
max|C2) is
lower than that when x < V . Therefore, Pr(V ′atk > V
′
max) is lower in the case
that legitimate flows fully use the link capacity than other cases. Thus, the
Lemma 17 is proved. 
Proof sketch of Theorem 7. We first just consider the legitimate traffic
but not the attack flow. As Lemma 17 illustrated, the more traffic sent
from legitimate flows, the harder for RLFD to correctly select the counter
with the attack flow fatk, thus to have the worst RLFD detection probability,
legitimate flow should use all outbound link capacity, and it requires the flow
number n ≥ ρ/γ.
Given n ≥ ρ/γ and m, we first construct a legitimate flow configuration
B(w, n,m), wi = γ for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ/γ and wi = 0 for i > ρ/γ which is
the worst-case legitimate configuration we want to prove, because there are
actually only the first ρ/γ flows with non-zero rate. For any legitimate flow
configuration B′(w′, n,m) with constraint of
∑k
i=1w
′
i = ρ. It is easy to find∑k
i=1wi ≥
∑k
i=1w
′
i.
Thus, according to Theorem 16 [59] the E[Si(w)] ≥ E[Si(w′)] for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m, where E[Si(w)] is the expected total counter value of the i
highest counters in the case of B(w, n,m) and E[Si(w
′)] is the one in the
case of any other legitimate flow configuration B′(w′, n,m).
It is not hard to find that the E[Si(w)] ≥ E[Si(w′)] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
suggests that the variation of expected counter values across all counters of
the B(w, n,m) is larger than that of the B′(w′, n,m). Let Vmax be the max-
imum counter value, and Vatk be the value of the counter randomly assigned
to the attack flow fatk (Vatk does not count the traffic of fatk). The higher
the variation, the larger the expected Vmax − Vi, thus the harder for RLFD
to correctly select the counter of fatk for the next level.
Therefore, the B(w, n,m) is the worst legitimate flow configuration for
RLFD to detect large flows. 
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Figure B.1: The probability Pworst(m,n, α) when n full-use legitimate flows
(at rate of γ), m counters, and a large flow at the rate of Ratk = α · γ.
B.1.4 Numeric Analysis for RLFD Detection Probability
Numeric analysis for single-level detection. For each theoretical
result, we show numeric examples in the scenario of nγ = 10
5 and m = 100,
a even more memory-limited setting than the one in the complexity analysis
(Section 4.4.4).
Figures B.1(a) to B.1(j) comprehensively shows the simulated worst-case
detection probability Pworst(m,n, α) in a level and its lower bound for various
number of full-use legitimate flows n ≤ nγ (50 to 105). We also give the
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Figure B.2: Twin-RLFD worst-case expected overuse damage E(Dover) (in
MBytes) and its upper bound for flat/bursty flows in various duty cycles θ,
burst periods Tb, and average rates Ratk = αγ, in the 40 Gbps link with
threshold rate γ = 400 Kbps (nγ = 10
5 full-use legitimate flows at most).
The Twin-RLFD has a limited memory of m = 100 counters (50 counters
for each RLFD), a typical number of levels d = 4, and detection cycle
T
(1)
c = 0.1 sec, T
(2)
c = 7.92 sec for two RLFDs respectively. Flows at the
EARDet detectable rate Ratk ≥ θγh = θ nγm+1γ are detected by the
EARDet with m = 100 counters in nearly zero damage.
numeric results with different m (100 and 1000) for comparison. When n =
105,m = 100, we can see α0.5 = 152 and α1.0 = 303, which are far smaller
than EARDet’s lowest detectable α = ρ
γ(m+1)
= nγ
m+1
= 991. For RLFD,
the α with actual worst-case detection probability of 0.5 and 1.0 are around
75 and 150, respectively, which are much lower than the α0.5 and α1.0. Thus,
it suggests RLFD’s ability of detecting low-rate large flows. The figures also
show that the probability of detecting low-rate flows increases as the number
of flows (n) decreases or the number of counters (m) increases. The figures
show that the α0.5, α1.0, and the lower bound holds for n > m, because we
derive it with the assumption of n  m logm. When n ≤ m, RLFD has
100% detection probability as explained in Section 4.4.
Since α1.0 decreases rapidly when n decreases, we approximate the total
detection probability by the detection probability of the first few levels.
Numeric analysis for total detection probability. In a tough scenario
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with nγ = 10
5, m = 100, and n = 107 legitimate flows in a link during one
detection cycle (around a second), RLFD has at least 0.25 and 1.0 probability
to detect a flat large flow with α = 152 and 303, respectively; and the
simulation results suggest that RLFD can detect a large flow with α = 75
and 150 with probability around 0.25 and 1.0, respectively. Again, EARDet
can only guarantee to detect α ≥ ρ
γ(m+1)
= nγ
m+1
= 991. That is, RLFD
outperforms the exact detection algorithm on low-rate large flows.
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Figure B.3: RLFD total detection probability; nγ = n = 10
5, m = 100.
Figure B.3 shows an example of simulated worst-case total detection prob-
ability Pr(Aα) and its theoretical lower bound (Theorem 11), when n = nγ =
105 and m = 100. The lower bound holds for the most of α, except some
very small ones whose Pr(Aα) is close to 0.
B.1.5 Numeric Analysis for Twin-RLFD Theoretical Overuse
Damage
Figures B.2(a) to B.2(e) show the expected overuse damage E(Dover) calcu-
lated in the worst case and its upper bound from Theorem 12, in a 40 Gbps
link with threshold rate γ = 400 Kbps (nγ = 10
5 full-use legitimate flows
at most). The Twin-RLFD has m = 50 counters for each RLFD, d = 4
levels, and detection cycle T
(1)
c = 0.1 sec and T
(2)
c = 7.92 sec for two RLFDs,
respectively. Damages by large flows with various duty cycles θ and burst
periods Tb are shown. Flows with an average rate Ratk higher than θγh (black
dash line) will be detected instantly by EARDet (with 100 counters) with
nearly zero damage.
The Twin-RLFD has d = 4 so that the number of virtual counters in the
RLFD bottom level (md = 504 = 6.25 × 106) is larger than the number of
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flows. Therefore, we the flows selected to the bottom level is fewer than the
counters, and RLFD can track each flow individually in the bottom level.
We set T
(1)
c = Tc = 0.1 sec around
β
γ
= 2×1514
400Kbps
= 0.06 sec (β is usually a
few times of maximum packet size 1514 Bytes, so that bursty flows are easier
to catch). If Tc  β/γ, it is hard for a large flow to reach burst threshold; if
Tc  β/γ, the detection delay is too long, resulting in excessive damage.
For Twin-RLFD’s second RLFD, T
(2)
c =
2dγh
αγ
T
(1)
c = 7.92 sec (according to
Theorem 12). Therefore, Twin-RLFD can guarantee detection for the worst-
case bursty flows (θTb < 2T
(1)
c ) at rate Ratk ≥ αγ = 100γ. We can guarantee
detection of lower rate flows with worst-case burstiness by increasing T
(2)
c ;
however, increased T
(2)
c increases the damage caused by worst-case bursty
flows. We say bursty flows with θTb < 2T
(1)
c are the worst-case bursty flows,
because such flows are unlikely showing up in every level of the RLFD with
cycle (T
(1)
c ), so that we have to use the RLFD with longer detection cycle
(T
(2)
c ) to catch those flows, which requires longer delay, thus higher damage.
Furthermore, such worst-case flows can inflict more damage by increasing θ
(thus the average rate), but remain undetectable by EARDet. As discussed
in Section 4.4.6, we can use choose different T
(2)
c randomly in different cycles
to prevent attackers from deterministically maximizing damage.
A hybrid scheme consisting of EARDet and Twin-RLFD can limit the
worst-case damage caused by flat flows (θ = 1) and bursty flows (θ < 1).
Specifically, for flows with an average rate larger than 30γ (i.e. 12 Mbps),
the damage is as low as tens of MBytes (less than ten MBytes for flat flows).
We admit that Twin-RLFD cannot limit the damage for flows at extremely
low rate ( 30γ) as effectively as for other flows, however other existing
schemes cannot neither, because of the limited memory. For flows at high
rates, although the Twin-RLFD detects them with almost 100% probability
in one detect cycle, it requires at least one cycle to finish detection, hence
the damage increases linearly with the flow rate.
Twin-RLFD and EARDet complement each other. Twin-RLFD can de-
tect flows with an average rate lower than θγh but it incompetent at detecting
high-rate flows, whereas EARDet is the opposite.
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B.2 Proof Sketches
B.2.1 Proof Sketch for RLFD Single-level Detection
Probability
Proof sketch of Theorem 8. In the analysis, we treat hashing flows into
counters as uniformly assigning n legitimate flows into counters and pick a
counter for the large flow fatk at random. We denote the random variable of
the maximum number of legitimate flows assigned to a counter as Y and the
random variable of the number of legitimate flows in the counter of the large
flow fatk as X.
Because the RLFD pick the counter with the largest value for the next
level, thus as long as the value of the large-flow counter (Ratk + X · γ)T is
higher than the value of the maximum-value legitimate counter Y · γT , the
large-flow counter will be picked, where T is the time length of the level.
Then we get
Pworst(m,n, α) =Pr(Ratk +X · γ − Y · γ > 0)
=Pr(Y −X < α)
=
∑
y
Pr(y −X < α|Y = y) · Pr(Y = y)
(B.6)
As we discussed in Section B.1.3, the distributions of X and Y are the
same as those of the Xb and Yb in a single-weight balls-into-bins game with
n balls and m bins, where the Xb is the random variable of the number of
balls in a randomly picked bin, and the Yb is the random variables of the
maximum number of balls in a counter. Thus, we can apply Theorem 18 (by
Raab and Steger [60]) to calculate the ymax, the upper bound of Y at high
probability.
Theorem 18 Raab and Steger’s Theorem 1. Let Y be the random
variable that counts the maximum number of balls in any bin, if we throw
n balls independently and uniformly at random into m bins. Then Pr(Y >
ymax) = o(1), if ymax =
n
m
+ λ
√
2 n
m
log n, λ > 1, m logm  n ≤ m ·
ploylog(m), and n is very large. When n→∞, o(1)→ 0.
We think it is a good approximation to our large-flow problem. Because the
number of legitimate flows n in a backbone link is more than a million, while
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the number of counters m is quite limited (e.g. one thousand counters in L1
cache, according to Section 4.4.2), thus we saym logm n ≤ m·ploylog(m)1
and n is very large. We derive the approximate lower bound of Pworst(m,n, α)
as follows:
Pworst(m,n, α) =
∑
y
Pr(y −X < α|Y = y) · Pr(Y = y)
=
∑
y≤ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y) +
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y)
≥
∑
y≤ymax
Pr(X > ymax − α, Y = y) +
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y)
= Pr(X > ymax − α) · Pr(Y ≤ ymax) +
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y)
(B.7)
We prove that the second part is o(1) as follows:∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y) ≤
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > ymax − α, Y = y)
= Pr(X > ymax−α) · Pr(Y > ymax−α)
= Pr(X > ymax−α) · o(1) = o(1)
(B.8)
According to Equation B.7 and B.8, we get
Pworst(m,n, α) ≥ Pr(X > ymax − α) · Pr(Y ≤ ymax) + o(1)
= Pr(X > ymax − α) · [1− Pr(Y > ymax)] + o(1)
= Pr(X > ymax − α) · (1− o(1)) + o(1)
= Pr(X > ymax − α)− o(1)
≈ Pr(X > ymax − α)
(B.9)
Therefore, when n is large, we approximately have Pworst(m,n, α) ≥ Pr(X >
ymax − α).
We let η = dymax−αe, and use random variable Mk to denote the number
of bins exactly contain k balls. We calculate Pr(X > ymax − α) as follows:
1Raab et al. also provides a similar ymax for m(logm)
3  n, but it is enough to only
discuss one of them for an approximate result.
98
Pr(X > ymax − α) = Pr(X > η) =
∑
k≥η
Pr(X = k)
=
∑
k≥η
∑
0≤mk≤m
Pr(X = k|Mk = mk) · Pr(Mk = mk)
=
∑
k≥η
∑
0≤mk≤m
mk
m
Pr(Mk = mk)
=
∑
k≥η
1
m
∑
0≤mk≤m
mkPr(Mk = mk) =
∑
k≥η
E(Mk)
m
=
∑
η≤k≤n
1
m
·m
(
n
k
)
(m− 1)n−k
mn
=
∑
η≤k≤n
(
n
k
)(
1− 1
m
)n−k( 1
m
)k
(B.10)
The above result requires to calculate the sum of the last m− η + 1 items
from the binomial distribution B(n, 1
m
). As we know, there are no simple,
closed forms for Equation B.10. According to the law of rare events [61], bi-
nomial distribution B(n, p) is approximate to Poisson distribution Pois(np),
when n is large and p is small. According to Equation B.15, the detection
probability Pr(Aα) is mainly related to non-bottom levels in which the num-
ber of flows nis large (n > m) , and p = 1
m
is small because m is around
hundreds to thousands, we approximately treat B(n, 1
m
) as the Poisson dis-
tribution Pois( n
m
), then we have
(
n
k
)(
1− 1
m
)n−k( 1
m
)k
≈ e
− n
m ( nm)
k
k!
(B.11)
which is the probability of the item happens k times in the Poisson distribu-
tion. Then, the Equation B.10 turns to
Pr(X > ymax − α) =
∑
η≤k≤n
(
n
k
)(
1− 1
m
)n−k( 1
m
)k
=
∑
η≤k≤n
e−
n
m ( nm)
k
k!
= 1−Q(η − 1, n
m
)
(B.12)
where Q(K, n
m
) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Poisson
distribution Pois( n
m
), i.e. sum of probabilities for 0 ≤ k ≤ K. As the Theo-
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rem 18 holds when λ > 1, thus we choose λ→ 1+, thus ymax = nm+
√
2 n
m
log n.
Because we focus on how does the probability lower bound change along with
the m and n, the λ does not matter much here. Therefore, we proved that
the 1 − Q(K, n
m
) is an approximate lower bound for Pworst(m,n, α), where
K = η − 1 = ⌊ n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n− α⌋. 
Proof sketch of Corollary 9. According to Theorem 8, Pworst(m,n, α0.5) >
1−Q(K, n
m
) approximately, where K =
⌊
n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n−α0.5
⌋
. As the me-
dian2 ν of the Poisson distribution Pois( n
m
) is bounded by n
m
− log 2 ≤ ν <
n
m
+ 1
3
[62]. Thus, ν ≈ n
m
, then
K ≈ n
m
⇒ α0.5 ≈
√
2
n
m
log n (B.13)
Therefore the Corollary 9 is proved.
Proof sketch of Corollary 10. According to Pearson’s skewness coeffi-
cients [63], the symmetry of a distribution is measured by its skewness. The
probability distribution is approximately symmetrical to its mean when the
skewness is small. According to [64], the skewness of Poisson distribution
Pois( n
m
) is
(
n
m
)−0.5
. Thus when n  m logm the Pois( n
m
) is approximately
symmetrical to its mean n
m
.
Because when α = 1 the actual Pworst(m,n, α) should be
1
m
≈ 0 (because
the large flow rate is the same as the legitimate flow rate, thus the detection
equals to randomly picking one from m counters), thus the approximate lower
bound 1−Q(Kα=1, nm) ≈ 0, where Kα=1 =
⌊
n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n−1⌋. As Pois( n
m
)
is symmetrical to Ks =
n
m
, when K = Ks + (Ks −Kα=1) ≈ nm −
√
2 n
m
log n ,
the 1 − Q(K, n
m
) ≈ 1, in which α ≈ 2α0.5 (according to Corollary 9). Thus,
α1.0 = 2α0.5 has been proved.
B.2.2 Proof Sketch for RLFD Total Detection Probability
Proof sketch of Theorem 11. For the detection level k, we use Ak,α to
denote the event that the counter containing the large flow fatk with average
rate of Ratk = αγ in the level k is selected for the next level, where γ is the
threshold rate, α > 1. Then the total probability for RLFD to catch the
large flow fatk in one detection cycle is
2The K such that the CDF Q(K, nm ) = 0.5
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Pr(Aα) =Pr(A1,α, A2,α, A3,α, ..., Ad,α)
=Pr(A1,α) · Pr(A2,α|A1,α) · Pr(A3,α|A2,α, A1,α)·
...P r(Ad,α|Ad−1,α, ..., A1,α)
=Pr(A1,α) · Pr(A2,α|A1,α) · Pr(A3,α|A2,α)·
...P r(Ad,α|Ad−1,α)
(B.14)
As we described in Section 4.4.2, we use the Cuckoo hashing in the bot-
tom level d to randomly assign flows into counters. Because we set enough
levels to make the input flows in the bottom level less than the counters, the
Pr(Ad,α|Ad−1,α) ≈ 1. For the levels k < d with n(k) legitimate flows, accord-
ing to Theorem 8 the Pr(Ak,α|Ak−1,α) ≥ Pworst(m,n(k), α). Considering the
maximum number of full-use legitimate flows in a link is nγ = ρ/γ,
• When n < nγ, Pr(Ak,α|Ak−1,α) ≥ Pworst(m,n(k), α)
• When n ≥ nγ, Pr(Ak,α|Ak−1,α) ≥ Pworst(m,nγ, α)
Therefore,
Pr(Aα) ≥
d−1∏
k=1
Pworst(m,min(nγ , n
(k)), α) (B.15)
where we approximately let n(k) = n/mk−1, which is the average value of n(k)
over repeated detection. n is the number of legitimate flows in the link.
According to Equation B.15 and the fact that α1.0 decreases fast as the n
(k)
decreases by the factor of m, Pworst(m,n
(k), α) for n(k) < nγ does not affect
the product much for the most of α values. Therefore, we can approximate
Prworst(Aα) as follows:
Pr(Aα) ≥

∏
{k|n(k)≥nγ}
Pworst(m,nγ , α), when n ≥ nγ
Pworst(m,n, α) , when n < nγ
(B.16)
where size of {k|n(k) ≥ nγ} is blogm(n/nγ)c+ 1, because n(k) = n(k−1)/m.
According to Theorem 8, approximately Pworst(m,n, α) ≥ 1 − Q(K, nm)
where K =
⌊
n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n − α⌋. Thus we can derive Theorem 11 from
Equation B.16.
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B.2.3 Proof Sketch for Twin-RLFD Theoretical Overuse
Damage
The upper bound of the expected overuse damage can be derived from the
average rate of a flat large flow and the expected detection delay: E(Dover) ≤
E(Tdelay) ·Ratk, because attack flows cannot cause more overuse damage than
the amount of traffic over-sent E(Tdelay) · Ratk. For a bursty flow with duty
cycle θ and burst period Tb, a RLFD can also treat it as a flat flow at the time
of each burst interval θTb. Thus, we can still use the detection probability
for flat flows to calculate the damage for bursty flows.
Lemma 19 and proof sketch.
Lemma 19 A RLFD with detection cycle Tc can detect bursty flows with
θTb ≥ 2Tc with the expected overuse damage:
E(Dover) ≤

Tcγα/θ
(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
Tcγα/θ
(
1−Q(K, n
m
))
)
, when n < nγ
(B.17)
where Kγ =
⌊nγ
m
+
√
2nγ
m
log nγ− αθ
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n− α
θ
⌋
, and Q(x, λ)
is the CDF of the Poisson distribution Pois(λ).
Proof sketch: Because θTb ≥ 2Tc, thus for each burst period Tb there
are must be at least
⌊
θTb
Tc
− 1⌋ detection cycles, in which RLFD can see
the attack traffic in all levels. When the RLFD observes the bursty flow, the
only difference from the detection over flat flow is that, the traffic rate at that
moment is α
θ
γ, instead of αγ in the case of flat flows. Thus, the probability
Pr(Aα) to detect such bursty flow in one detection cycle is calculated as the
one for flat flow detection in Theorem 11, by replacing the α with the α
θ
. The
expected detection delay E(Tdelay) is derived as follows:
E(Tdelay) ≤ 1
Pr(Aα)
Tb⌊
θTb
Tc
− 1⌋ ≈ TcθPr(Aα) (B.18)
Then we get the over-sent attack traffic in the input link is E(Tdelay) · Ratk,
and the overused bandwidth by attack traffic is less than or equal to that,
because the some attack packets may also be dropped during congestion.
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Thus we get the expected overuse damage E(Dover):
E(Dover) ≤ E(Tdelay) ·Ratk ≤ Tcγα/θPr(Aα) (B.19)
Thus, according to Theorem 11, we get the upper bound of the overuse
damage in the Lemma 19. The proof also holds when θ = 1, which is for the
case of flat flows. 
Proof sketch of Theorem 12. The overuse damage in the case of θTb ≥
2T
(1)
c are from Lemma 19. When θTb < 2T
(1)
c and Ratk < θγh, we prove the
damage as follows:
Tb <
2T
(1)
c
θ
<
2T
(1)
c
Ratk
γh =
2T
(1)
c
αγ
γh =
T
(2)
c
d
(B.20)
Thus the Tb is less than a detection level period of the EFD
(2), which means
the bursty flow is like a flat flow to EFD(2). Therefore, we use the overuse
damage upper bound in Lemma 19, when θ = 1, Tc = T
(2)
c , and we get
E(Dover) ≤

T (2)c γα/
(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
T (2)c γα/
(
1−Q(K, n
m
))
)
, when n < nγ
(B.21)
where Kγ =
⌊nγ
m
+
√
2nγ
m
log nγ−α
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m
+
√
2 n
m
log n−α⌋. By replacing
T
(2)
c with
2γh
αγ
T
(1)
c , we proved the Theorem 4.3.
B.3 Additional Table
Table B.1: Settings of RLFD and CLEF.
m 20 40 70 100 150 200 400
T ∗` .242 .242 .242 .242 .242 .242 .242
Single RLFD
d 4 3 3 3 3 3 2
T ∗c .968 .726 .726 .726 .726 .726 .484
Twin-RLFD (in CLEF)
d 7 5 4 4 4 3 3
T
(1)∗
c 1.69 1.21 .968 .968 .968 .726 .726
T
(2)∗
c 168.6 63.75 31.92 26.56 21.96 10.68 7.59
∗ Time unit is second.
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